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PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS AND THE MCNULTY
MEMO: SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT
SCRUTINIZE AN ORGANIZATION'S PAYMENT
OF ITS EMPLOYEES' ATTORNEYS' FEES?
Noah D. Stein*
INTRODUCTION
"Those who commit crimes-regardless of whether they wear white or
blue collars-must be brought to justice. The government, however, has
let its zeal get in the way of its judgment. It has violated the Constitution
it is sworn to defend."1
With that statement, Judge Lewis Kaplan of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York rebuked federal prosecutors for
pressuring the accounting firm KPMG not to pay attorneys' fees for several
executives embroiled in a government investigation. 2 Judge Kaplan's
opinion in United States v. Stein was a milestone in the debate over the U.S.
Department of Justice's policy that allows federal prosecutors to scrutinize
an organization's advancement of attorneys' fees to its employees, 3 which
may have the effect of impeding or limiting that advancement. 4 The
practice of advancing fees to attorneys is widespread, 5 and in many cases
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Bruce A. Green for his invaluable guidance and support throughout the writing of this Note.
I am also grateful to Professor Rebecca Roiphe for her suggestions, Lauren Frank for her
timely encouragement, and to my family for their support.
1. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). This Note's
author is not related to the defendant in the case.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Laurie P. Cohen & Paul Davies, Court Says Prosecutors Pressure White-
Collar Defendants Unfairly, Wall St. J., June 28, 2006, at Al (reporting a defense lawyer's
assessment of the opinion as a "big decision"); Posting of Peter Lattman to WSJ.com Law
Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/06/27/judge-kaplans-stunning-kpmg-ruling (June 27,
2006, 11:07 EST) (noting the decision's importance).
4. See infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text. In this Note, the term "employee"
may also mean "executive" or "partner" or any other worker employed by an organization,
except where otherwise noted. "Advancement" refers to an organization's payment of an
employee's attorneys' fees before it knows whether the employee is entitled to
indemnification. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. Generally, if an organization
eventually determines that an employee does not qualify for indemnification, then the
employee must repay any money advanced. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
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the practice is authorized or required by state law or by contract. 6 Because
of the possibility of organizations using advancement as part of a criminal
conspiracy,7 however, the government's policy allows prosecutors to take
advancement into account, along with a range of other factors, in deciding
whether to lodge a criminal charge against an organization. 8 Given the
legitimate need for advancement in many cases, a public debate over the
government's scrutiny of such payments began with the decision in Stein
and afterwards soon came to a head. 9
Although Judge Kaplan based his order in Stein on a constitutional law
analysis, the two sides in the larger debate have raised several public policy
concerns. Two distinct, alternative policy visions have emerged out of this
debate: The Senate Judiciary Committee proposed a bill that would ban
prosecutors from scrutinizing advancement, 10 and the Justice Department
developed a new version of its policy that limits its ability to scrutinize
advancement while reserving discretion to do so in limited circumstances.I'
To date, considerations of prosecutorial ethics have not been directly
addressed in the debate over scrutinizing advancement. This Note seeks to
remedy that omission, reviewing the policy arguments and assessing their
intersection with ethical considerations, to contribute to the debate and to
inform any future attempts to change the Justice Department's policy.
Prosecutors' ethical responsibilities may impact the arguments about
scrutinizing advancement, which matters for two reasons. First, prosecutors
act within the context of ethical duties, 12 and those duties may support or
contradict policy concerns. Thus, a review of prosecutorial ethics can
provide fresh insights regarding the relative value of changing or
maintaining the Justice Department's current policy. Second, where
prosecutors are not constrained by the constitutional requirements noted in
Stein, 13 the Justice Department's current policy gives prosecutors discretion
6. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See infra Part I.B.2-3.
10. See infra notes 103, 108 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
12. See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1573, 1576
(noting that prosecutors are subject to unique ethical duties, an obligation which reflects the
well-accepted understanding that they should "conduct themselves differently from other
lawyers"); infra Part I.C. 1-2.
13. At least one court so far has disagreed with the analysis in Stein. See United States v.
Stodder, No. 2:05-CR-00027, 2006 WL 3066196, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2006) (dictum)
(declining to adopt the Stein court's analysis that the government's policy violated
individuals' constitutional rights, finding the analysis unsupported and unpersuasive).
Moreover, in Stein, the court based its holding in part on findings of fact specific to the
KPMG case. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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to take advancement into account in some cases.1 4 In such cases, ethical
considerations may indicate how they should use that discretion. 15
Accordingly, Part I of this Note introduces the topic of advancement and
describes how organizations pay employees' attorneys' fees, often to attract
and retain talented employees but sometimes to impede criminal
investigations. This part then traces the evolution of the government's
policy on scrutinizing advancement to ensure that organizations do not use
it to shield illegal conduct, starting with the Holder Memorandum and
continuing to the Thompson Memorandum. This part also describes the
Stein case, where the court found that the government's policy and
prosecutors' implementation of that policy violated the constitutional rights
of several former KPMG employees. Then, Part I explains how the debate
over advancement in the wake of Stein led to proposed legislation that
would ban outright any government scrutiny of advancement, which in turn
led the Justice Department to amend its policy-this part describes both the
legislation and the policy amendment. Next, this part explains that while
ethics rules do not subject prosecutors to disciplinary action for scrutinizing
advancement, the norms of ethical conduct nonetheless create certain
responsibilities to ensure procedural fairness and individuals' access to
counsel. Finally, Part I explains that, while those ethical obligations are
limited in scope, where prosecutors do retain discretion they sometimes
impose on themselves standards that promote effective self-regulation.
Part II of this Note describes the opposing views on government scrutiny
of advancement and draws out the ethical implications inherent in that
debate. First, Part II examines claims by critics of the Justice Department
who argue that the government's policy denies individuals access to
competent counsel and undermines both the presumption of innocence and
the adversarial system. Then, it describes various ethical concerns that
intersect with those public policy critiques. Next, this part describes
arguments that scrutinizing advancement is vital to preventing obstruction
of investigations and that prosecutors use their discretion to scrutinize
advancement only in rare cases where doing so is warranted. Part II then
identifies certain ethical obligations inherent in those claims.
Finally, Part III of this Note assesses the debate over the Justice
Department's policy on advancement in light of prosecutors' ethical
obligations. It argues that weighing the ethical considerations in light of the
overall prosecutorial ethics framework reveals that prosecutors should
retain discretion to consider advancement, which in turn suggests that the
government should not adopt the proposed legislation containing an
absolute ban on scrutinizing fee payments. Instead, this part argues that the
current Justice Department policy is generally consistent with norms of
prosecutorial ethics, although it lacks specificity in one regard. Lastly, this
14. See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in
Their Investigative Role, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 723, 751 (1999) (suggesting that ethical
precepts can help guide prosecutors in the wise use of their discretion).
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part proposes an amendment to the current policy that would fix the
existing ambiguity and give clear guidance on when prosecutors should
scrutinize advancement, limiting scrutiny to those situations where the
advancement is being used improperly.
I. ADVANCEMENT: THE PRACTICE, THE EVOLUTION OF THE
GOVERNMENT'S POLICY, AND PROSECUTORS' RELATED ETHICAL DUTIES
A. Advancement of Attorneys 'Fees
Organizations, in an attempt to attract talented individuals, may
indemnify their employees against legal liability when that liability arises in
the course of the individuals' service to the organization.' 6 An important
corollary to indemnification is advancement, an organization's payment of
an employee's expenses as the employee incurs them.17 Advancement
provides employees with "immediate interim relief from the personal out-
of-pocket financial burden of paying the significant on-going expenses
inevitably involved with investigations and legal proceedings."' 8 This
assistance supports an employee while the organization determines whether
the employee is entitled to indemnification, "a decision that must
necessarily await the outcome of the investigation or litigation."', 9
Many states have passed laws that require corporations to pay legal
expenses through indemnification or advancement 20 or that authorize them
to provide such payments by adopting provisions within their bylaws,
articles, or employment agreements.21 The statutes allow the organizations
16. Stephen A. Radin, "Sinners Who Find Religion ": Advancement of Litigation
Expenses to Corporate Officials Accused of Wrongdoing, 25 Rev. Litig. 251, 258-59 (2006)
(citing Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005)).
17. See id. at 261 (noting that the benefit of advancement is "separate and distinct" from
indemnification (quoting Homestore, 888 A.2d at 212) and likening it to "an extension of
credit" (quoting Fasciana v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 829 A.2d 160, 182-83 (Del. Ch. 2003))).
18. Homestore, 888 A.2d at 211. Advancement may be even more important to
employees than indemnification, since "the costs of defending a lawsuit often are more
daunting and immediate than the threat of ultimate[] liability." John F. Olson, Jonathan C.
Dickey & Aric H. Wu, Litigation and the Director, 1569 Practicing L. Inst. 179, 188 (2006),
available at WL 1569 PLI/Corp 179.
19. Kaung v. Cole Nat'l Corp., 884 A.2d 500, 509 (Del. 2005).
20. Dale A. Oesterle, Limits on a Corporation's Protection of Its Directors and Officers
from Personal Liability, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 513, 546 (noting that in most states, either a
statute or the common law requires an organization to pay an employee's legal expenses
where the employee's defense succeeds); see Steven J. Schleicher, Comment, Director
Liability Dilemma: Providing Relieffor Executive Anxiety, 56 UMKC L. Rev. 367, 379-80
(1988) (citing a Delaware law requiring indemnification in certain situations).
21. See Schleicher, supra note 20, at 378-79 (citing Delaware and Missouri laws
authorizing indemnification in certain situations); see also Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, The
Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal
Investigations, 41 Duq. L. Rev. 307, 332 (2003) (noting that the vast majority of states have
such statutes). Where adopted, the agreements impose contractual obligations on
organizations, and those that refuse to advance fees face declaratory judgments and damages
verdicts. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra, at 332 (citing Ridder v. CityFed Fin. Corp., 47
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to pay for expenses related to proceedings whether those proceedings are
civil or criminal, investigative or administrative, or threatened, pending, or
completed. 22  Many states also have adopted statutes authorizing
indemnification and advancement for members and employees of
partnerships and other business organizations, such as limited partnerships
and limited liability companies. 23 Some also have authorized the payment
of legal fees for public officials. 24 However, a state's laws may treat
corporations and partnerships differently from each other. For example,
Delaware mandates indemnification for corporate officers and directors
who prevail in their defenses, 25 but it merely authorizes indemnity for
partnership employees. 26
The main purpose of indemnification and advancement is to allow
organizations to attract talented employees by providing an assurance that
the organization will cover their expenses if they are sued or incur liability
in connection with their employment. 27 Further, organizations may believe
that paying legal expenses boosts employee morale and "that it is unfair to
require an employee whose corporate conduct is under investigation to pay
for [his or her] own defense before any adjudication of guilt, much less
before any determination of guilt or responsibility on the part of the
individual could even be made."'28 Because of its benefits, the practice is
widespread.29 Indeed, the Justice Department even has adopted internal
regulations providing advancement for prosecutors who become the
subjects of federal criminal investigations. 30
To balance the need to attract and retain competent employees with the
desire not to sanction illicit conduct, indemnification and advancement
statutes generally stipulate that organizations cannot cover an employee's
costs where the individual's actions were improper or criminal. 3 1 However,
F.3d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 1994) and Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818, 819-20 (Del.
1992)).
22. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2001); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 351.355(1) (West
2001). For an overview of the similarities and differences between state laws governing the
provision of attorneys' fees, see Oesterle, supra note 20, at 536-61.
23. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
24. Id. at 354 n.106.
25. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(c).
26. See id. tit. 6, § 15-110. Delaware's law authorizing indemnification by partnerships
also extends to advancement. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355. Some large firms are formed as
Delaware partnerships. See, e.g., Ernst & Young Legal Disclaimer,
http://www.ey.com/global/content.nsf/US/Home -Legal Disclaimer (last visited Mar. 19,
2006) (noting that the big four accounting firm is a Delaware limited liability partnership
(LLP)); infra note 68 (noting that KPMG is a Delaware LLP).
27. Oesterle, supra note 20, at 514-16.
28. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 21, at 334.
29. See id. at 332.
30. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 50.15(a)(7), 50.16 (2006).
31. Oesterle, supra note 20, at 540-41; see, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.0850(7) (West
2001) (prohibiting payment of legal fees where the employee violated criminal law, derived
an improper personal benefit, violated statutes governing distributions to shareholders or
purchases of the organization's shares, or engaged in willful misconduct or consciously
disregarded the best interests of the organization or of shareholders in certain contexts); 28
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if the organization has promised to advance expenses to employees, then it
must make the advances even if it appears likely that an employee's
wrongful conduct will make indemnification unavailable to the employee at
the end of the case.32 In other words, if an organization has "contracted" to
advance expenses in its bylaws or charter or in an employment agreement,
it "bear[s] the risk of later non-payment... in the event that the underlying
conduct... and/or the outcome of the matter ultimately disentitles [the
employee] to indemnification." 33
While the payment of attorneys' fees serves legitimate governance and
retention purposes, some organizations have used the practice to further
criminal ends. For example, drug rings and organized crime syndicates
have provided "'house counsel' to subordinates... in the hopes that the
lawyers will deter, or at least mitigate the effects of, cooperation by their
clients." 34 In some cases, corporations can have similar incentives to try to
prevent employees from cooperating by retaining or referring lawyers to
represent employees.35
C.F.R. § 50.15(a)(7) (conditioning reimbursement on, among other things, whether the
government declined to indict or file an information against the employee).
32. See Radin, supra note 16, at 268-69. A long line of cases establishes this rule in
Delaware, and the limited case law on this subject outside of Delaware establishes the same
rule. See id. at 269-80.
33. Fasciana v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 829 A.2d 160, 175 (Del. Ch. 2003). Some
scholars have expressed doubt that organizations actually recoup money advanced to
employees who end up being convicted. See Pamela H. Bucy, Indemnification of Corporate
Executives Who Have Been Convicted of Crimes: An Assessment and Proposal, 24 Ind. L.
Rev. 279, 316 (1991). But see William M. Bulkeley, CA Sues Ex-CEO to Recoup Legal Fee,
Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 2006, at B2 (reporting that after the former CEO of CA Inc. was
convicted, a court attached his home and other property pending a suit by the company to
recoup fees it had advanced).
34. Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 69, 122 (1995) (footnote
omitted); see Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of
Executives' Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts 24-25 (Aug. 29, 2006) (unpublished
research paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=927783 (citing an organized crime
example to illustrate a potential danger of advancement in the corporate context).
35. Richman, supra note 34, at 122-23, 123 n.188 (citing James B. Stewart, Den of
Thieves 314-15 (1991)). In his book, Stewart describes how lawyers defending the infamous
financier Michael Milken and his company, Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., decided which
lawyers to recommend for Drexel employees who would be called as witnesses in the
government's case against Milken and Drexel. Stewart, supra, at 311-15. With Drexel
paying the employee-witnesses' attorneys' fees, the attorneys representing Drexel and
Milken chose "friendly" attorneys who had an established preference for fighting the
government or who had received significant business referrals from Milken and Drexel's
attorneys and, thus, might feel obliged to (or dependent on) the attorneys for Milken and
Drexel. Id. at 311,314-15.
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B. The History of the Justice Department's Scrutiny of Advancement
1. The Initial Policy on Scrutinizing Advancement: The Holder and
Thompson Memoranda
The federal government first formalized its policy on advancement in
June 1999, when Eric Holder, Jr., then Deputy Attorney General of the U.S.
Department of Justice, issued a policy memorandum that provided
guidelines for federal prosecutors in deciding whether to file criminal
charges against an organization. 36 The policy, titled "Federal Prosecution
of Corporations," 3 7 also called the "Holder Memo," 38 listed eight factors
that prosecutors should consider in reaching a determination. 39 One of
those factors was the extent of the organization's "willingness to cooperate
in the investigation of its agents," 40 and to help prosecutors evaluate the
cooperation, the Holder Memo listed several considerations that prosecutors
could weigh.4 1 One consideration was the organization's willingness to
waive its attorney-client privilege and work product protections.42 Another
consideration, which concerned advancement, was spelled out in the
following provision:
[A] factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the corporation
appears to be protecting its culpable employees and agents. Thus, while
cases will differ depending on the circumstances, a corporation's promise
of support to culpable employees and agents, either through the advancing
of attorneys fees, through retaining the employees without sanction for
their misconduct, or through providing information to the employees
about the government's investigation pursuant to a joint defense
agreement, may be considered by the prosecutor in weighing the extent
and value of a corporation's cooperation.4 3
The Holder Memo expressly limited the consideration of advancement in
some contexts. Specifically, it said, "[s]ome states require corporations to
pay the legal fees of officers under investigation prior to a formal
determination of their guilt. Obviously, a corporation's compliance with
governing law should not be considered a failure to cooperate. '44
36. Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-
Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1095,
1099-1100 (2006).
37. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
All Component Heads and U.S. Att'ys (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memo], available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html.
38. Wray & Hur, supra note 36, at 1099.
39. See Holder Memo, supra note 37, at II.A.
40. Id. at II.A.4.
41. See id. at VI.B.
42. Id. at II.A.4, VI.B.
43. Id. at VI.B.
44. Id. at VI.B n.3. For a description of the Holder Memo and its other provisions, see
Carmen Couden, Note, The Thompson Memorandum: A Revised Solution or Just a
Problem?, 30 J. Corp. L. 405, 407-13 (2005).
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In early 2003, in the wake of Enron and other major corporate scandals,
Larry Thompson, Holder's successor, issued a memorandum updating the
Holder Memo. 45  Thompson's policy, titled "Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations," also called the "Thompson
Memo," 46 adopted the Holder Memo's general principal on assessing an
organization's cooperation. 47  The Thompson Memo's advancement
provision, in the comment to the general principal on assessing cooperation,
exactly tracked the one in the Holder Memo,48 and it also retained verbatim
the Holder Memo's ban on scrutinizing fee payments mandated by state
law. 49 While in this regard the Thompson Memo's language was consistent
with its predecessor's, the new policy stressed that an organization's
cooperation with an investigation was the key driver of the government's
decision whether to seek charges, 50 thus emphasizing the factor for which
advancement was a consideration. The Thompson Memo also included
new language indicating another consideration that counted in assessing an
organization's cooperation, besides advancement and related examples of
protection of culpable employees: whether the organization had acted to
impede the investigation. 51
To a large extent, the Thompson Memo, and thus the Holder Memo
before it, merely codified long-standing Justice Department practices,
"commit[ting] to paper what good prosecutors [had] been doing for
45. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Att'ys, at VI.A. (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter
Thompson Memo], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm.
46. Wray & Hur, supra note 36, at 1101.
47. The Thompson Memo stated, "In gauging the extent of the corporation's
cooperation, the prosecutor may consider the corporation's willingness to identify the
culprits within the corporation, including senior executives; to make witnesses available; to
disclose the complete results of its internal investigation; and to waive attorney-client and
work product protection." Thompson Memo, supra note 45, at VI.A. This provision was
nearly identical to the one in the Holder Memo. Compare id., with Holder Memo, supra note
37, at VI.A.
48. Compare text accompanying note 43, with Thompson Memo, supra note 45, at VI.B.
In addition to privilege waivers and advancement, the Thompson Memo listed considerations
that may indicate noncooperation, including an organization's retaining culpable employees
without sanction and its formation of a joint defense agreement with culpable employees.
Thompson Memo, supra note 45, at VI.B.
49. Compare text accompanying note 44, with Thompson Memo, supra note 45, at VI.B
n.4.
50. Thompson Memo, supra note 45, at preface ("The main focus of the revisions is
increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation's cooperation.").
51. See id. at VI.B. The provision provided the following examples of conduct
indicating obstruction of the investigation:
[1] overly broad assertions of corporate representation of employees or former
employees; [2] inappropriate directions to employees or their counsel, such as
directions not to cooperate openly and fully with the investigation including, for
example, the direction to decline to be interviewed; [3] making presentations or
submissions that contain misleading assertions or omissions; [4] incomplete or
delayed production of records; and [5] failure to promptly disclose illegal conduct
known to the corporation.
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decades."'52 Nonetheless, these formal policy documents drew fire from
commentators. 53 The initial criticism focused on the use of privilege
waivers in determining the authenticity and extent of an organization's
cooperation and ignored the policy on advancement. 54
2. United States v. Stein Brought Concerns About Scrutinizing
Advancement into the Limelight
The Justice Department's policy of scrutinizing advancement moved into
the spotlight in United States v. Stein, which involved the largest tax fraud
in U.S. history, a scheme that defrauded the public out of $2.5 billion in tax
revenue. 55 The events at issue in Stein began in early 2002, when the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued several summonses to KPMG as part
of an investigation into the organization's marketing of improper tax
shelters. 56 Rather than turn over materials, KPMG took "steps... designed
to hide its tax shelter activities. ' 57 In one such step, KPMG invoked 26
U.S.C. § 7525, a confidentiality privilege relating to taxpayer documents, to
protect documents that did not justify the privilege and that contained
damning evidence. 58 Frustrated by the lack of compliance, IRS officials
referred the matter to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
for enforcement. 59  Meanwhile, a Senate subcommittee running a
concurrent investigation into illegal tax shelters began holding public
hearings, and in November 2003, the committee heard testimony from
52. The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate
Investigations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 113 (2006)
[hereinafter Thompson Memo Hearings] (statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen.
of the United States).
53. See, e.g., Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics,
Professionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 859, 904 ("The
defense bar has repeatedly raised concerns about these policies ...."); Peter J. Henning,
Targeting Legal Advice, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 669, 695-701 (2005) (arguing that the Thompson
Memo is symptomatic of the Justice Department's overcriminilization of legal advice); Wray
& Hur, supra note 36, at 1170-84 (citing various criticisms of the Thompson Memo,
particularly regarding its emphasis on cooperation).
54. See, e.g., Robert A. Del Giomo, Corporate Counsel as Government's Agent: The
Holder Memorandum and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, Champion, Aug. 2003, at 22, 22-24
(discussing the policy and critiquing the privilege waiver issue while omitting any mention
of the advancement provision); ABA Presidential Task Force on the Attorney-Client
Privilege et al., Recommendation 111 (Aug. 2005),
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/documents/report 11 .pdf (recommending reform of the policy
on privilege waivers but making no mention of advancement).
55. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, KPMG to Pay $456 Million for Criminal
Violations in Relation to the Largest-Ever Tax Shelter Fraud Case (Aug. 29, 2005), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/August/05-ag-433.htm.
56. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
57. United States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30, 37-38 (D.D.C. 2004).
58. Id. at 38.
59. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
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several KPMG executives. 60 During those hearings, some committee
members expressed displeasure with KPMG and its executives. 61
Concerned about the tone of the Senate hearings and the ongoing IRS
investigation, KPMG's chairman, Eugene O'Kelly, hired renowned lawyer
Robert Bennett "to come up with a new cooperative approach" toward the
government. 62  As part of that strategy, KPMG dismissed eighteen
executives involved with the suspect tax shelters, including the firm's
deputy chair and chief operating officer, Jeffrey Stein.63 By virtue of
Stein's senior position and close friendship with O'Kelly, KPMG offered
him retirement with a "very generous" consulting contract-negotiated in
"very friendly" discussions with O'Kelly-which paid Stein $100,000 per
month for three years and which promised to reimburse his attorneys' fees
in any legal proceedings against him.64
Despite the dismissal of employees, the IRS made a criminal referral to
the Justice Department in early 2004,65 and in February 2004, prosecutors
from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York
(USAO) met with KPMG's lawyers. 66 Bennett began the meeting by
saying that KPMG's "object was to save KPMG, not to protect any
individuals." 67 Later, Bennett noted that the firm had no obligation to
provide advancement, 68 but it had a common "practice of paying its
employees' legal expenses" and asked if KPMG could continue that
practice in this investigation.69 Prosecutors responded that they would
"take into account KPMG's legal obligations, if any, to advance legal
expenses," but then referred KPMG to the Thompson Memo. 70 During that
same conversation, prosecutors warned KPMG that they would scrutinize
fee advancement arrangements. 7'
60. Id.
61. Id. at 338-39 (noting one senator's comments suggesting general wrongdoing and
another's belief that a KPMG executive was testifying dishonestly).
62. Id. at 339 (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 339 & n.23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Id. at 339.
66. Id. at 341.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 342 (noting "that Delaware law gave the company the right to do whatever it
wished"). KPMG is a Delaware LLP. Id. at 355 n. 117. Delaware partnership law authorizes
but does not require partnerships to offer advancement to employees. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
69. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 341-44. Prosecutors told KPMG that "misconduct should not or cannot be
rewarded and referred to federal guidelines." Id. at 342 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Shortly thereafter, prosecutors noted that if KPMG had discretion in its advancement
decision, then the government would "look at [its decision whether to advance fees] under a
microscope." Id. at 344 & n.52 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). The court
found that "while the USAO did not say in so many words that it did not want KPMG to pay
legal fees, no one at the meeting could have failed to draw that conclusion." Id. at 344.
3254 [Vol. 75
2007] PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS AND THE MCNULTY MEMO 3255
Following the meeting, KPMG informed the government that it would
cap fee advancement at $400,000 and condition payment on the employees'
full cooperation with the government. 72 Beginning in March 2004, the
USAO notified KPMG's lawyers whenever an employee refused to be
interviewed or invoked the Fifth Amendment in refusing to respond to
questions.73 Upon such notice, KPMG contacted the employee's lawyer
and threatened to cease paying attorneys' fees unless the employee began to
cooperate with the government. 74 Some employees relented; others refused
to cooperate and were promptly fired by KPMG and denied payment for
legal fees. 75 During this time, KPMG reimbursed Stein for nearly $650,000
in attorneys' fees. 76 KPMG kept from the government the existence and
terms of its agreement with Stein, as well as its advancement of $650,000 to
him.7 7 Ultimately, the government indicted the employees. 78
On August 29, 2005, KPMG entered into a deferred prosecution
agreement (DPA) with the government, 79 in which the firm admitted that it
broke the law in marketing illegal tax shelters and in making
misrepresentations to the IRS.80  Furthermore, the firm admitted that
criminal conduct was "deliberately approved and perpetrated at the highest
levels of KPMG's tax management, and involved dozens of KPMG partners
and personnel. ' 8 1  As part of the DPA, KPMG agreed to pay the
government $456 million in fines.8 2
On January 19, 2006, the indicted employees moved to dismiss their
indictments or for other relief on the ground that the government's
interference with KPMG's advancement of attorneys' fees was improper. 83
On June 26, 2006, Judge Kaplan issued his opinion, holding that the
Thompson Memo and the government's implementation of it violated the
KPMG employees' constitutional rights to substantive due process and
fairness in criminal proceedings 84 and their constitutional right to counsel. 85
The holding rested in part on the court's findings that KPMG had an
72. Id. at 345.
73. Id. at 347.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 348 n.74.
77. See Margulies, supra note 34, at 42 (citing Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 339). It is
unclear when the government learned of the exact economic terms of Stein's severance
agreement, but by August 2004, the USAO knew that the package was "sizeable." Stein, 435
F. Supp. 2d at 348 n.75.
78. See Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (referring to employees as "subjects of the
indictment in this case").
79. Id. at 349.
80. Margulies, supra note 34, at 41.
81. Government's Post-Hearing Memorandum on Issues Concerning the Defendants'
Right to Counsel at 14 n.10, Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 [hereinafter Government's
Memorandum] (quoting the KPMG deferred prosecution agreement (DPA)).
82. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
83. Id. at 350.
84. Id. at 362-65.
85. Id. at 367-69.
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"unbroken track record" of advancing attorneys' fees prior to the events at
issue in the Stein case,86 which gave the defendants an expectation that the
firm would pay their legal expenses. 87
3. After Stein, the Debate over Advancement Intensified
Stein was not the first case in which prosecutors scrutinized the
advancement of attorneys' fees to employees. 88 In other cases, federal
prosecutors have pressured companies not to advance attorneys' fees to
employees, 89 or have indicated that advancement would be considered a
sign of noncooperation.9" Nonetheless, Stein was the first case to address
the government's advancement policy directly, and it brought the
controversy over the government's policy on advancement to the fore.
Emboldened by Judge Kaplan's opinion, critics of the Thompson Memo
stepped up their assault. In August 2006, the American Bar Association
(ABA) House of Delegates unanimously adopted a resolution opposing the
practice of scrutinizing advancement of attorneys' fees.91 On September
12, 2006, the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the Thompson
Memo and included the advancement provision in its focus. The ABA's
president and two former U.S. Attorneys General were among those who
testified, and all three of these witnesses criticized the Thompson Memo's
advancement provision. 92 Paul McNulty, the Justice Department's Deputy
86. Id. at 356.
87. Id.
88. See Nathan Koppel, U.S. Pressures Firms Not to Pay Staff Legal Fees, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 28, 2006, at BI (noting three cases where prosecutors reportedly scrutinized payments
of attorneys' fees); see also Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 21, at 335 ("Today, it is
common for defense counsel to be confronted by a federal prosecutor who believes that a
corporation is not fully cooperating with the government in a federal criminal investigation
solely because the corporation is paying the legal fees for an officer, director or employee.").
89. Koppel, supra note 88. Counsel for Symbol Technologies, Inc., claimed that federal
prosecutors urged the company not to pay attorneys' fees for executives accused of
accounting fraud. Id. There, prosecutors ultimately allowed the advancement after the
company convinced them that its bylaws required the payments. Id. Similarly, in an
accounting fraud trial of five former executives of Enterasys Networks, Inc., prosecutors
pressured the company to deny advancement to the executives. Id. In the case against
Enterasys, the presiding U.S. district court judge expressed concern that federal prosecutors
had acted improperly, although he did not sanction the prosecutors. Id.
90. Id. (reporting that lawyers involved in the prosecution of HealthSouth Corp. said that
prosecutors informed the company that the government would count advancement of
attorneys' fees to indicted executives as a sign of noncooperation).
91. See ABA Presidential Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege,
Recommendation 302B (Aug. 2006), http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/am06302b.pdf
[hereinafter Recommendation 302B].
92. See Thompson Memo Hearings, supra note 52, at 93-95 (statement of Karin J.
Mathis, President, ABA) (listing several problems with the advancement provision and
related considerations on protecting culpable employees); id. at 130 (statement of Edwin
Meese III, Chairman, Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, Heritage Foundation)
(recommending removal of the advancement provision); id. at 142 (statement of Dick
Thornburgh, former Att'y Gen. of the United States) (calling the advancement provision
"problematic").
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Attorney General, also testified, defending the government's policy on
advancement. 93 On November 30, 2006, a committee of business and legal
practitioners and academics that had formed with the U.S. Treasury
Secretary's blessing to recommend ways to improve the competitiveness of
the U.S. capital markets 94 issued a report critical of the Thompson Memo. 95
In part, the criticism focused on the policy on scrutinizing advancement. 96
As these events were unfolding, several other commentators, 97
practitioners, 98 and scholars99 weighed in on the debate.
4. Two Competing Solutions Emerged: The McNulty Memorandum and
the Specter Bill
Out of the controversy over the Thompson Memo, two solutions
emerged. First, critics took the position that prosecutors should never
consider advancement as a factor in determining an organization's
cooperation. For example, the resolution that the ABA House of Delegates
adopted states the following:
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association opposes government
policies, practices and procedures that... requir[e], encourag[e] or
permit[] prosecutors or other enforcement authorities to take into
consideration.., in making a determination of whether an organization
has been cooperative in the context of a government investigation.., that
the organization... advanced, reimbursed or indemnified the legal fees
and expenses of, an [e]mployee .... 100
Similarly, the interim report of the Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation recommended "that the Justice Department revise its
prosecutorial guidelines to prohibit federal prosecutors from seeking.., the
denial of attorneys' fees to employees, officers, or directors."10' These
recommendations express categorical opposition, containing no exceptions
93. See id. at 120-21 (statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen. of the United
States).
94. See David Reilly, Booming Audit Firms Seek Shield from Suits, Wall St. J., Nov. 1,
2006, at C 1; see also Greg Ip, Is a U.S. Listing Worth the Effort?, Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 2006,
at C I (claiming that the committee had the Treasury secretary's support for its research).
95. See Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, Interim Report 84-86 (Nov. 30, 2006),
available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/I1.30Committee Interim_.ReportREV2.pdf
(criticizing the Thompson Memo and recommending changes to the Justice Department's
policy).
96. See id. at 85.
97. See, e.g., Lattman, supra note 3.
98. See, e.g., Has the Government Gone Too Far in Its War on Corporate Crime?,
WSJ.com, Nov. 1, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI16224475563608109.html
[hereinafter Has the Government Gone Too Far?] (discussing the debate between current
and former prosecutors, including one who helped draft the Thompson Memo). '
99. See generally Margulies, supra note 34 (describing the risks of advancement-
including agency costs, moral hazard, race to the bottom, and cognitive biases-and
criticizing the Stein court's analysis).
100. Recommendation 302B, supra note 91, at Recommendation.
101. Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, supra note 95, at 86.
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that would allow prosecutors to take advancement into account in certain
circumstances. 102
This view took concrete form on December 8, 2006, when Senator Arlen
Specter, then Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, proposed a bill
that would take a hard line approach to curbing prosecutors' discretion in
determining an organization's cooperation for charging purposes. 10 3
Although the bill's explicit focus is on the attorney-client privilege portion
of the Thompson Memo, 10 4 it notes among its findings that prosecutors can
"conduct their work while respecting ... the rights of individuals"'10 5 and
that an indictment can have "devastating consequences" on an
organization. 106 Moreover, it contains language that prohibits prosecutors
from considering advancement under any circumstances when determining
an organization's level of cooperation. 107 Specifically, the bill provides that
prosecutors "shall not ... condition a civil or criminal charging decision
relating to a[n] organization ... or use as a factor in determining whether an
organization.., is cooperating with the [g]ovemment... the provision of
counsel to, or contribution to the legal defense fees or expenses of, an
employee of that organization."' 0 8 The bill does not contain any provisions
creating exceptions, indicating that its prohibition is absolute in forbidding
prosecutors from considering advancement under any circumstances when
determining an organization's level of cooperation.
An alternative solution emerged less than a week after Senator Specter
first announced his proposal, when Deputy Attorney General McNulty
issued a memorandum that superseded the Thompson Memo and provided
an updated policy on assessing an organization's cooperation for charging
purposes. 10 9 The new policy, known as the "McNulty Memo,"' 10 makes
102. See supra notes 100-0 1 and accompanying text.
103. Senator Specter announced the bill on December 7, 2006. See Posting of Ashby
Jones to WSJ.com Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/12/07/specter-takes-on-
thompson-memo (Dec. 7, 2006, 13:19 EST). He introduced the bill the following day.
Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, S. 30, 109th Cong. (2006). Subsequently,
on January 4, 2007, Senator Specter reintroduced the bill. Attorney-Client Privilege
Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007). The 2007 version is identical to the
previous version, except for the date in the title of the bill. Compare S. 30, with S. 186.
104. See S. 30 (referring in the title and in the majority of the provisions to privileges or
work product protections and waivers).
105. Id. § 2(a)(5).
106. Id. § 2(a)(7).
107. Id. § 3(a).
108. Id. The bill also prohibits prosecutors making charging decisions from considering
whether an organization waived the attorney-client or work product privileges; shared
information with employees, informally or through a formal agreement, such as a joint-
defense agreement; or failed to terminate or otherwise sanction employees for exercising
constitutional or other legal protections in response to government requests. See id.
Moreover, in addition to ruling out this conduct and advancement as bases for a charging
decision, the bill also prohibits prosecutors from requesting or demanding that a company
engage in such conduct. See id.
109. See Lynnley Browning, U.S. Moves to Restrain Prosecutors, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13,
2006, at Cl (reporting that the Justice Department released the updated policy on December
12, 2006).
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significant changes to the previous policy, including placing substantive
and procedural constraints on prosecutors' use of discretion in choosing
whether to treat an organization's payment of attorneys' fees to its
employees as a sign of noncooperation. Specifically, the new policy states
that prosecutors "generally should not take into account" advancement as a
sign of noncooperation"'I except in "extremely rare cases." 112
Additionally, the McNulty Memo expounds on the rare case exception,
saying that prosecutors may only take advancement into account where "the
totality of the circumstances show[s] that it was intended to impede a
criminal investigation. In these cases, fee advancement is considered with
many other telling facts to make a determination that the corporation is
acting improperly to shield itself and its culpable employees from
government scrutiny."'"13 The policy references the discussion in the
government's brief,'1 4 which makes the point that prosecutors are permitted
to look at advancement as a sign of noncooperation "only" in the context of
a "panoply of factors that made it appear a company was circling the
wagons,"11 5 but which does not list any specific factors. 116
Furthermore, the McNulty Memo retains the Thompson Memo's absolute
prohibition on scrutinizing advancement when organizations are obligated
to advance fees under state law and expands the rule to bar scrutiny where
organizations are obliged to pay attorneys' fees under contractual
agreements with employees, such as those contained in "corporate charters,
bylaws or employment agreements." ' 1 7 In addition to these substantive
limits on scrutinizing advancement, the McNulty Memo adds a procedural
requirement: Where prosecutors wish to invoke the rare case exception and
take advancement into account, they must first obtain approval from the
Deputy Attorney General using the same process required for requesting
privilege waivers.1 18 Thus, the new policy places new procedural as well as
substantive limits on prosecutors' ability to scrutinize advancement.
Although the McNulty Memo adds restrictions, another change stipulates
that the policy "is not meant to prevent a prosecutor from asking questions
110. See Editorial, The McNulty Memo, Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 2006, at A18 [hereinafter
Editorial, The McNulty Memo].
111. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Att'ys, at VII.B.3 (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter
McNulty Memo], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnulty-.memo.pdf.
112. Id. at VII.B.3 n.3.
113. Id.
114. See id. (citing Brief for the United States of America at 1, United States v. Smith,
No. 06-3999-cr (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 2006)). The appeal is of an order in Stein, dated July 26,
2006, which incorporated in part the June 27, 2006 order (discussed in detail in Part I.B.2 of
this Note) and which suppressed the statements of two defendants in the case. Brief for the
Appellant, supra, at 1.
115. Brief for the United States of America, supra note 114, at 51-52, 52 n.*.
116. See id.
117. McNulty Memo, supra note 111, at VII.B.3.
118. Id. at VII.B.3 n.3.
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about an attorney's representation of a corporation or its employees" 119 and
that questions about "how and by whom attorneys' fees are paid" are
"appropriate."1 20
C. Prosecutors' Ethical Responsibilities Related to Advancement
Part L.A of this Note explained organizations' practice of advancing
attorneys' fees to their employees. Part I.B then described how the
government's policy of scrutinizing advancement evolved, with the Justice
Department offering its most recent iteration after receiving criticism from
the court in Stein and from a host of other critics. Part I.C examines
prosecutorial ethics and shows that, although the ethics rules are silent on
scrutinizing advancement, norms of ethical conduct create some
responsibility for prosecutors to protect procedural fairness and individuals'
access to counsel. Next, this part explains that those ethical obligations are
limited in scope and describes how the government sometimes develops
standards of self-regulation to help prosecutors exercise their discretion.
1. Specific and General Provisions of the Disciplinary Rules Regarding
Prosecutors
The various codes of professional conduct subject prosecutors to
disciplinary action for failure to comply with ethics rules, 12 1 but no rule
squarely addresses whether prosecutors may interfere with an
organization's advancement of attorneys' fees to its employees. Rule 3.8 of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct lists the duties specific to the
prosecutor function, 122 but none of its provisions are directly relevant to
119. Id. at VII.B.3.
120. Id. at VII.B.3 n.4. The McNulty Memo also retains language that appeared in the
Thompson Memo indicating that another consideration in determining the organization's
cooperation, besides shielding culpable employees, is whether the organization intentionally
impeded the investigation. In the McNulty Memo, this language appears in the subsection
entitled "Obstructing the Investigation." See id. at VII.B.4. That provision immediately
follows, but is separate from, the subsection on "Shielding Culpable Employees and
Agents," which in turn contains the advancement provision. See id. at VII.B.3. The
"Obstructing the Investigation" subsection lists six examples of conduct indicating
obstruction:
[1] overly broad assertions of corporate representation of employees or former
employees; [2] overly broad or frivolous assertions of privilege to withhold the
disclosure of relevant, non-privileged documents; [3] inappropriate directions to
employees or their counsel, such as directions not to cooperate openly and fully
with the investigation including, for example, the direction to decline to be
interviewed; [4] making presentations or submissions that contain misleading
assertions or omissions; [5] incomplete or delayed production of records; and [6]
failure to promptly disclose illegal conduct known to the corporation.
Id. at VII.B.4. Except for the second example, all of those listed appeared in the Thompson
Memo. Compare id., with supra note 51.
121. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 8.4(a) (2003) ("It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to . . . violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct.").
122. See id. R. 3.8.
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advancement. 123 Other disciplinary rules that impose broad obligations
seem, by their terms, capable of implying a duty not to interfere with
advancement. For example, Model Rule 8.4(d) states that "[i]t is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice." 124 Additionally, ethics rules
direct prosecutors to "seek justice."' 125 However, courts generally find
violations of Model Rule 8.4(d) only in combination with other
violations. 126 Moreover, scholars note that the duty to do justice is vague
and allows for different interpretations of prosecutors' responsibilities. 127
On the one hand, it could mean that prosecutors should strictly apply the
letter of the law and avoid mercy. 128 On the other hand, it could mean that
prosecutors should ensure "that convicted defendants do not suffer unduly
harsh treatment."' 29 Moreover, the duty to seek justice does not indicate
particular requirements prosecutors should follow, 130 and courts have
declined to fill in the duty with specific obligations. 13 1  Furthermore,
123. For example, Model Rule 3.8(b) requires a prosecutor to "make reasonable efforts to
assure that the accused has been ... given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel." See id.
Despite that rule's seemingly broad language about access to counsel, however, it imposes
on a prosecutor only the narrow duty to let a judge inform an unrepresented defendant of the
right to counsel and to remind any judge who may forget to raise the issue. See Green, supra
note 12, at 1591.
124. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 8.4(d).
125. Model Code of Prof I Responsibility EC 7-13 (1981) ("The responsibility of a public
prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to
convict."); see also Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. 1 ("A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."). Although the
duty to do justice appears as a comment, and not a binding rule, in the Model Rules, the
comments "provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules." Model Rules of
Prof'1 Conduct Preamble 14. Moreover, most prosecutors accept that the duty to seek
justice imposes responsibilities like those identified in the rules. See Bruce A. Green, Why
Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 607, 616 (1999).
126. See, e.g., In re Zawada, 92 P.3d 862, 866 (Ariz. 2004) (en bane). In Zawada, the
court found violations of the Arizona versions of Model Rule 3.1 ("assertions made without
good faith basis in law or fact"), Model Rule 3.4(e) ("trial tactics unsupported by admissible
evidence"), and Model Rule 8.4(d) ("misconduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice"). Id. at 866. There the prosecutorial misconduct "included (a) appeals to fear by the
jury if [the defendant] was not convicted, (b) disrespect for and prejudice against mental
health experts that led to harassment and insults during cross-examination, and (c) improper
argument to the jury." Id. at 864.
127. See Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual
Framework, 15 Am. J. Crim. L. 197, 218 (1988) (noting that the ethics codes give "scant
guidance" on what it means for a prosecutor to seek justice); Carolyn B. Ramsey, The
Discretionary Power of "Public" Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 1309, 1312 (2002) (noting that "justice" is a "mutable abstraction[]" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
128. See Green, supra note 125, at 622-23; Ramsey, supra note 127, at 1312 (noting that
in the late nineteenth century "justice" was "equated with high conviction rates").
129. Green, supra note 125, at 623.
130. See id.; Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45, 46 (1991).
131. See Fisher, supra note 127, at 218 (noting that case law does not contradict the view
that the duty to do justice has no independent content and merely suggests prosecutors
should not violate other rules); Green, supra note 125, at 623.
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scholars note that when courts do invoke the requirement, they do so as a
general admonishment when they deem prosecutors to have acted
overzealously.' 32 Accordingly, courts likely will not discipline prosecutors
for conduct that limits advancement.
2. Norms of Ethical Conduct Create Responsibilities for Prosecutors
Regarding Procedural Fairness and Access to Counsel
Even if no ethics rule subjects prosecutors to disciplinary action for
interfering with advancement, prosecutors may still have a responsibility to
avoid the practice if it is at odds with general ethical concerns and norms
concerning the use of prosecutorial discretion. 133 Indeed, many prosecutors
consider it their responsibility to go further than the rules require. 134 In two
areas related to scrutinizing advancement in particular-protecting
procedural fairness and respecting access to counsel-the norms of ethical
conduct create responsibilities for prosecutors.
First, scholars note that the duty to do justice that appears in the ethics
codes reflects an expectation that prosecutors should seek to protect fairness
in criminal proceedings. 135 One reason for this is that prosecutors wield
tremendous power, 136 because they control considerable resources 137 and
have "tremendous" discretion. 138 Left unchecked, that prosecutorial power
132. See Fisher, supra note 127, at 218-19; Green, supra note 125, at 623.
133. See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 Am. Inst. Crim. L. &
Criminology 3, 4 (1940) ("[T]he spirit of fair play and decency... should animate the
federal prosecutor."); Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined
Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 553, 558 (1999) (noting that
prosecutors' "most important work occurs in the area where the rules [governing prosecutor
conduct] are silent" and that prosecutors must apply a "practical sense of what is right and a
moral standard" to fill gaps in the rules); cf Green, supra note 125, at 618-19 (noting the
difference between "ethics rules," which subject prosecutors to disciplinary action for
misconduct, and "ethics in the broader sense of involving what a prosecutor should do in
situations where the law offers a choice"); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 67, 72 (2005) ("Compliance with the law
means more than seeking to avoid sanctions-it entails an attitude of respect toward legal
norms.").
134. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 669, 684 (noting that "[m]any prosecutors impose a higher standard of
probability upon their charging decisions" than the ethics rules require).
135. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2003) (stipulating that the
responsibility of a minister of justice "carries with it [a] specific obligation[] to see that the
defendant is accorded procedural justice," but noting that the extent of this obligation is "a
matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions").
136. See John S. Edwards, Professional Responsibilities of the Federal Prosecutor, 17 U.
Rich. L. Rev. 511, 511 (1983); Jackson, supra note 133, at 3 ("The prosecutor has more
control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.").
137. See Zacharias, supra note 130, at 59 ("[The prosecutor] benefits from the state's
hefty investigative and litigation resources. Through the police and grand jury, [the
prosecutor] monopolizes the ability to coerce testimony and obtain cooperation in the
investigation of crimes." (footnote omitted)).
138. See Jackson, supra note 133, at 3; Zacharias, supra note 130, at 58.
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could lead to abuses. 139 Indeed, since the adversarial nature of the legal
system underlies the professional codes, 140 some claim that prosecutors
should check their power on their own to ensure that proceedings remain
adversarial, without one side overwhelming the other. 14 1 In other words,
prosecutors have a responsibility to pursue "adversarially valid results."'1 42
This power-based view of the duty to do justice creates specific
prosecutorial responsibilities, such as the requirement to intervene where
the defense counsel's performance is substandard. 143
Additionally, scholars suggest that since prosecutors represent the
sovereign, 144 the duty to seek justice requires them to preserve fairness in
criminal proceedings. 14 5 According to these scholars, the public demands
fair governance from the state, so prosecutors representing the sovereign
should not only punish wrongdoers but also should ensure that they do not
139. See Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting
Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 Duke L.J. 945, 963 (1993) (noting
that some abuses are inevitable where enormous power is unchecked); Zacharias, supra note
130, at 58 ("[T]he fear of unfettered prosecutorial power is the impetus for the special ethical
obligation.").
140. See Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to
Include the Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 923, 926 (1996).
141. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984) ("'While a criminal trial is not
a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills,
neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators."' (quoting United States ex rel.
Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 1975))); Melilli, supra note 134, at 691-97
(discussing the effect of the adversary system and the relevance of prosecutorial ethics);
Zacharias, supra note 130, at 59.
142. Zacharias, supra note 130, at 60 (emphasis omitted); see also Flowers, supra note
140, at 962-74 (discussing the need for ethics standards to restrain prosecutors in the
investigation of a case and proposing areas for regulation); Little, supra note 15, at 751-56
(suggesting that prosecutors should be required or encouraged to consider which steps to
pursue in an investigation and how aggressively to pursue them to avoid disproportionate
burden to targets and third parties); Melilli, supra note 134, at 702 (suggesting that for
prosecutors merely to trust in the adversary system to protect the innocent, without using
self-restraint, is "too great a concession").
143. See Zacharias, supra note 130, at 66 (noting that "[a]dversarial justice breaks down
most clearly when a criminal defense attorney does not even roughly match the prosecutor's
talents or fails to represent his client's interests," for example when defense counsel is (1)
"bad or indolent"; (2) incapacitated by "illness, alcohol, or distractedness"; (3) "lack[ing] ...
time or resources to prepare"; or (4) constrained by the government or court, e.g., where the
government times an indictment to limit counsel's opportunity to defend).
144. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("[The prosecutor] is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all ....");
United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) ("[T]he
government of the United States is not capable of exercising its powers on its own; the
government functions only through its officers and agents. We thus infer in criminal cases
that an Assistant United States Attorney, acting within the scope of authority conferred upon
that office, is the alter ego of the United States exercising its sovereign power of
prosecution."); Green, supra note 125, at 633.
145. See Green, supra note 125, at 636; see also Zacharias, supra note 130, at 57
(suggesting that prosecutors serve the goals of several "constituencies," including "the
community's [interest in] protection, victims' desire for vengeance, defendants' entitlement
to a fair opportunity for vindication, and the state's need for a criminal justice system that is
efficient and appears fair" (footnotes omitted)).
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punish the innocent. 146  Moreover, prosecutors should treat similarly
situated criminals equally and impose punishments that are proportional to
the crimes committed. 147  Furthermore, under this role-based view,
prosecutors should not only ensure that they obtain criminal convictions
through a fair process but also should avoid any public perception that the
process is unfair. 148 Scholars note that the public also expects that the
government will fight corporate crime, 149 and the courts have sanctioned
that expectation, 150 so prosecutors are responsible for carrying it out.
Nonetheless, even in the corporate crime context, prosecutors' specific
responsibilities regarding the preservation of fair procedure still exist. 151
To the extent that these responsibilities are in tension, prosecutors acting for
the sovereign must balance the competing interests.1 52 Thus, in light of
prosecutors' role as the sovereign's representatives and their superior
power, the duty to seek justice creates some responsibilities for prosecutors
to ensure procedural fairness.
Second, in addition to indicating that prosecutors should ensure
procedural fairness, commentators claim that the ethics provisions express
an overarching concern that individuals have access to competent
representation. For example, these scholars point out that prosecutors have
a duty to ensure that a court notifies a defendant of the right to
representation, 153 and they have an affirmative duty to notify the court of a
146. See Green, supra note 125, at 634 (noting that the goal of avoiding punishment of
the innocent, "as reflected in the 'presumption of innocence,' is paramount in importance");
see also Melilli, supra note 134, at 671-72 (suggesting that all prosecutors should regard the
possibility of even charging innocent people, let alone convicting them, as the greatest
concern).
147. See Green, supra note 125, at 634.
148. See id. at 636. The McNulty Memo's executive summary echoes this concern. See
McNulty Memo, supra note 111, at I (noting that federal prosecutors "must maintain public
confidence in the way in which they exercise their charging discretion").
149. See John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 Am. U. L. Rev.
579, 602-30 (2005) (discussing how Congress created new offenses and the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines to help overcome pro-defendant biases inherent in the law and allow
for more effective prosecution of corporate crime); Robert G. Morvillo & Barry A. Bohrer,
Checking the Balance: Prosecutorial Power in an Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 137, 139-52 (1995) (arguing that Congress's passage of federal laws initially
aimed at organized crime, such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) and the Criminal Forfeitures Act, gave prosecutors wide latitude to pursue corporate
crime and that Congress sanctioned the development by refusing to narrow the scope of
those laws and by passing new laws with similarly broad language).
150. See Hasnas, supra note 149, at 595-630 (noting that the courts played a crucial role
in easing prosecution of white collar crime by (1) creating corporate vicarious liability, (2)
broadly interpreting new federal offenses criminalizing corporate conduct, and (3) allowing
an implementation of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines that favors prosecutors).
151. Green, supra note 125, at 636.
152. See id. at 634; see also Melilli, supra note 134, at 698 ("[T]he prosecutor must
define the public interest in specific cases."); Zacharias, supra note 130, at 57-58
("Prosecutors . . . face conflicts among their constituents' interests as well as between
constituent and personal interests.").
153. See supra note 123.
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defense lawyer's incompetence.' 5 4 Moreover, the Standards Relating to the
Administration of Criminal Justice, which are not binding on prosecutors
but which represent guidelines for conduct, indicate that ethical norms
recognize "the critical importance of' competent representation in criminal
proceedings.' 55 Accordingly, prosecutors have an ethical responsibility to
ensure that defendants receive a certain level of representation.
3. Scope of Prosecutors' Ethical Responsibilities: Limits on
Responsibility, Context of Prosecutorial Discretion, and Self-Imposed
Regulation for Sensitive Issues
Although prosecutors have ethical responsibilities to protect procedural
fairness and respect the right to counsel, their responsibilities in this area
are not unlimited. For example, the ethics rules impose only minimal
obligations on prosecutors to ensure a defendant's access to competent
counsel. Model Rule 3.8(b) creates a duty, but only a narrow one. 156
Model Rule 1.1 requires lawyers to provide clients with "competent
representation," which requires "legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."' 157  However,
commentators have noted that the "rule permits even neophyte lawyers to
handle criminal cases even when the cases are a 'wholly novel field' to the
lawyer, so long as counsel studies hard using universal lawyering skills." 158
Moreover, while ethical norms may suggest that prosecutors have a
responsibility to notify the court if defense counsel is incompetent, 159 it is
not clear that they need do more.
Courts have set a similarly low standard. Although the constitutional
right to counsel includes the right to effective counsel, 160 the courts have
not precisely defined effectiveness 16 1 and haye set a high bar for
determining ineffective assistance. 162 Indeed, "some courts have upheld
154. See generally Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet a "Walking
Violation of the Sixth Amendment" If You're Trying to Put That Lawyer's Client in Jail?, 69
Fordham L. Rev. 997 (2000) (discussing scholars views on the subject); supra note 143 and
accompanying text. The duty may also extend to notifying the court if defense counsel has
conflicts of interest. See Bruce A. Green, Her Brother's Keeper: The Prosecutor's
Responsibility When Defense Counsel Has a Potential Conflict of Interest, 16 Am. J. Crim.
L. 323, 352-53 (1989).
155. See Recommendation 302B, supra note 91, at I & nn.9-10.
156. See supra note 123.
157. Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 1.1 (2003).
158. Myrna S. Raeder, Andrew E. Taslitz & Paul C. Giannelli, Convicting the Guilty,
Acquitting the Innocent: Recently Adopted ABA Policies, 20 Crim. Just. 14, 18 (2006)
(quoting and discussing Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 1.1 cmt. 2).
159. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
160. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984).
161. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 638 P.2d 338, 343 n.6 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981) ("'Effective
counsel' is defined not as errorless counsel but as counsel whose assistance is within [a]
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.").
162. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (holding that "[t]here
are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case," so courts "must
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convictions in which defense counsel slept through much of the trial or was
intoxicated during it; or where counsel conducted little, if any, serious
investigation and could not recall a single relevant case." 163 Besides setting
a low standard for effectiveness, courts usually have held that the right to
counsel attaches only after indictment, not during investigations. 164
Moreover, although defendants have the right to counsel of their choice,
they have no right to counsel that they cannot afford. 165 In the same vein,
the Supreme Court has allowed prosecutors to seek forfeiture of money that
a defendant paid or needed to pay to an attorney for defense in criminal
proceedings if the money belonged to another or came from criminal
conduct. 166 Such forfeiture does not violate defendants' Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, according to the Court's holdings in United States v.
Monsanto167 and Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States.168 Thus,
the ethics rules and the courts impose only limited obligations regarding
access to competent counsel.
Not only are prosecutors' affirmative obligations limited in scope, but
prosecutors generally have broad discretion to enforce the law,169 and ethics
rules place few limits on the exercise of that discretion. 170 Model Rule 3.8
"deals with only one aspect of prosecutorial discretion-the core decision
indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance").
163. Raeder, Taslitz & Giannelli, supra note 158, at 18.
164. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (plurality decision) ("In a line of
constitutional cases in this Court... it has been firmly established that a person's Sixth...
Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial
proceedings have been initiated against him."). But see United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp.
2d 330, 366-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that the government could not limit defendants'
access to funds for their defense where such limitation would likely have an unconstitutional
effect post-indictment).
165. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).
166. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
167. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 614 ("IN]either the Fifth nor the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution requires Congress to permit a defendant to use assets adjudged to be forfeitable
to pay that defendant's legal fees.").
168. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626 ("A defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to
spend another person's money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are
the only way that that defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his choice .... [T]he
[g]overnment does not violate the Sixth Amendment if it seizes the ... proceeds [of a crime]
and refuses to permit the defendant to use them to pay for his defense.").
169. See Green, supra note 12, at 1587-88 ("The most distinctive and significant aspect of
prosecutorial conduct is the exercise of discretion concerning such questions as whom to
investigate, whom to charge and what charges to bring, whether to negotiate the terms of a
guilty plea, whether to grant immunity from prosecution, whether to drop charges or
continue a case to trial, what sentence to seek, and whether to move to vacate a conviction or
sentence."); Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing "Discretionary
Justice," 13 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 167, 168 (2004).
170. See Green, supra note 12, at 1587; Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating
Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 381, 397 (2002) ("[T]he codes place no
meaningful restriction on prosecutors' conduct in the areas that are the most momentous and
contentious-that is, with regard to the exercise of discretion regarding charging, plea
bargaining, and sentencing.").
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whether to prosecute a criminal charge-and incorporates a standard that is
•.. low and incomplete." 17' Moreover, the discretion afforded prosecutors
under the ethics rules is especially pronounced in the investigatory
context.1 72 There, prosecutors are exempted even from some limits placed
on other lawyers, such as the constraints on gathering evidence for
litigation. 173 Additionally, although prosecutors must ensure procedural
fairness, scholars note that they have discretion to put pressure on the
targets of an investigation to gain their cooperation. For example, the
government regularly flips witnesses to uncover facts in an investigation,
using the threat of prosecution to secure cooperation by parties whom they
believe to be criminally culpable. 174  Furthermore, prosecutors "ask
cooperating drug dealers, bank robbers and gun-toting felons to waive their
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination," and they do so "all
the time [even though] the vast majority of [those criminals] do not have
access to ... high-priced legal talent."' 75
Thus, prosecutors' responsibility to ensure that criminal proceedings are
fair still leaves them with very broad discretion, especially in investigations,
and allows them to use tactics that induce or compel witness cooperation.
Accordingly, prosecutorial encroachments on access to counsel are not per
se unethical, nor does prosecutors' use of the broad discretion afforded
them necessarily create procedural unfairness. Rather, one must look to the
specific practice and its consequences, in light of prosecutors' ethical
responsibilities, to determine whether that practice is ethical.
171. Green, supra note 12, at 1588. Model Rule 3.8(a) bars prosecution of "a charge that
the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause." Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R.
3.8(a) (2003). "Since the law requires criminal charges to be supported by probable cause,
however, this provision adds nothing to the standard already established by law." Green,
supra note 12, at 1588; see Melilli, supra note 134, at 680 (noting that this sole check on
prosecutors' charging discretion is "unimposing" and "essentially meaningless").
172. See Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors:
The Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 291, 378-
79 (1992); Green, supra note 125, at 632-33; Little, supra note 15, at 725 (noting that the
ethics codes and standards "say virtually nothing specific to guide the ethics of the
investigating prosecutor").
173. See Green, supra note 125, at 633. Specifically, prosecutors are able to employ
agents to use deceit to gather information, while other lawyers may not. See id. at 633 &
n.117.
174. See United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987) ("No
practice is more ingrained in our criminal justice system than the practice of the government
calling a witness who is an accessory to the crime for which the defendant is charged and
having that witness testify under a plea bargain that promises him a reduced sentence.");
Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate
Citizenship," 76 St. John's L. Rev. 979, 979 (2002) ("Judicial leniency for cooperators traces
its roots back hundreds of years to the common law practice of approvement, and American
prosecutors have been striking deals with cooperators since at least the nineteenth century."
(footnote omitted)); Wray & Hur, supra note 36, at 1182. Indeed, the ABA Task Force that
prepared the report and resolution opposing the Justice Department's policy on advancement
acknowledged that using the threat of prosecution to secure cooperation was well
established. Recommendation 302B, supra note 91, at II.
175. Thompson Memo Hearings, supra note 52, at 121 (statement of Paul J. McNulty,
Deputy Att'y Gen. of the United States).
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Moreover, although prosecutors investigating crimes generally may be
free from judicial interference and externally imposed restrictions, they
might still be expected to self-regulate according to some standards of
conduct.' 76 Indeed, scholars note that the Justice Department has issued
internal guidelines, collected as the United States Attorneys' Manual (the
"Manual"),' 177 to help prosecutors exercise their discretion carefully, 78
filling gaps left by external rules. 179 In some cases, the Justice Department
uses its guidelines to address sensitive subjects. For example, to deal with
the "important and sensitive" issue of capital punishment, 180 the Justice
Department has guidelines to direct prosecutors in seeking the death
penalty. 181  Similarly, the Justice Department has guidelines for
subpoenaing members of the media and defense lawyers, 182 recognizing
that these two types of subpoenas have caused public outcry over freedom
of the press 183 and concerns about the attorney-client relationship, 184
respectively. For all of those practices, the Manual imposes procedural
restrictions, requiring prosecutors to obtain approval from senior leadership
at Justice Department headquarters in Washington, D.C. ("Main Justice")' 85
before proceeding. 186 In some cases, the Manual also sets out the specific
176. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
177. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual (2d ed. 2004)
[hereinafter Dep't of Justice Manual, Printed Version].
178. See Benjamin R. Civiletti, The Prosecutor as Advocate, 25 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1, 2
(1979); Podgor, supra note 169, at 169.
179. See Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators
Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 69, 77 (1995) (noting that for the
most part the manual addresses issues not covered by the ethics codes); Levenson, supra
note 133, at 556 n. 10 (noting that the manual sets forth factors a prosecutor should consider
in making decisions).
180. Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the
Department of Justice's Role, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 347, 437 (1999).
181. See Dep't of Justice Manual, Printed Version, supra note 177, tit. 9, 9-10.000; see
also Little, supra note 180, at 407-19 (discussing the guidelines).
182. See Dep't of Justice Manual, Printed Version, supra note 177, tit. 9, 9-11.255
(bearing the title "Prior Department of Justice Approval Requirements-Grand Jury
Subpoenas to Lawyers and Members of the News Media"); U.S. Dep't of Justice, United
States Attorneys' Manual, tit. 9, 9-13.410 (2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foiareading.room/usam/title9/text/usam9Ol3.wpd [hereinafter Dep't of Justice Manual,
Online Version] (bearing the title "Guidelines for Issuing Grand Jury or Trial Subpoena to
Attorneys for Information Relating to the Representation of Clients").
183. See, e.g., Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and Fourth Estate Inmates: The
Misguided Pursuit of a Reporter's Privilege, 24 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 385, 412-13, 413
n.155 (2006) (noting widespread press condemnation of prosecutors' use of journalist
subpoenas in one recent case).
184. See, e.g., Cramton & Udell, supra note 172, at 360 & n.283 (noting the criminal
defense bar's attacks on subpoenaing attorneys and claims that the practice "sow[ed]
distrust" between lawyers and clients).
185. Little, supra note 180, at 351 & n.13.
186. See, e.g., Dep't of Justice Manual, Printed Version, supra note 177, tit. 9, 9-10.040
(requiring prosecutors to obtain the Attorney General's approval to proceed with a death
penalty prosecution); id. tit. 9-11.255 (requiring prosecutors to obtain the Attorney General's
approval before subpoenaing a journalist to testify to the grand jury and the approval of the
Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division before subpoenaing an attorney to
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factors or types of factors that the senior officials must consider in reaching
a determination. 187 In other cases, the internal guidelines may not define
the factors, 188 but instead stipulate how Main Justice will weigh whatever
factors prosecutors propose. 18
9
Besides giving guidance to prosecutors, the Manual's benefits include
increasing fairness' 90 and uniformity' 9' in the enforcement of federal law.
One commentator has noted that it also prevents mistakes and abuses. 192
Scholars explain that the guidelines can also provide an important benefit
that is specific to prosecutors: It can help them avoid external regulations
that they feel would remove too much of their discretion. 193 Finally, while
the Justice Department's internal guidelines may provide the basis for the
Department to discipline a prosecutor, they are not enforceable by the
testify about representation of a client or fees paid by the client). The McNulty Memo
imposes similar requirements on prosecutors seeking a privilege waiver or taking
advancement of attorneys' fees into account in charging decisions. See supra note 118 and
accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Dep't of Justice Manual, Printed Version, supra note 177, tit. 9, 9-13.410
(indicating that approval to subpoena attorneys is given based on whether the information
sought is privileged; the information could be obtained from alternative sources; the
information is essential to the case and in criminal cases that there are reasonable grounds to
believe a crime was or is being committed; the need for information outweighs the potential
adverse effects on the attorney-client relationship; and the subpoena is narrowly drawn);
Dep't of Justice Manual, Online Version, supra note 182, tit. 9, 9-13.400 (indicating that
approval to subpoena journalists or media records is given based on whether the information
sought is essential to the case, the information could be obtained from alternative sources or
through negotiations with the media, and the subpoena is narrowly drawn).
188. For example, the Manual allows the government in determining whether to seek
capital punishment to consider "any legitimate law enforcement or prosecutorial reason
[that] weighs for or against seeking the death penalty." Dep't of Justice Manual, Printed
Version, supra note 177, tit. 9, 9-10.080.
189. See id. The guidelines require prosecutors to consider whether "statutory
aggravating factors applicable to the offense and any non-statutory aggravating factors
sufficiently outweigh the mitigating factors." Id. Furthermore, the policy defines which
aggravating and mitigating factors can be considered, based on evidentiary standards, and
sets a threshold for the aggravating factors; mandates a qualitative, not quantitative, analysis
of the factors; and permits the disregard of "weak" aggravating or mitigating factors. See id.
190. See, e.g., id. ("The authorization process is designed to promote consistency and
fairness.").
191. See, e.g., id.; see also Michael Edmund O'Neill, When Prosecutors Don't: Trends
in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 221, 237 (2003). Indeed,
achieving uniformity may have been the primary goal of the Holder Memo. Id. at 244.
192. See Conference, The Independent Counsel Process: Is it Broken and How Should it
Be Fixed?, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1515, 1546 (1997) ("'[T]he whole purpose of [the U.S.
Attorneys' Manual] is so that there can be a uniform, cohesive system of law enforcement
throughout the United States, with the centralized control in Washington, to make sure that
some Assistant or some U.S. Attorney isn't going off half-cocked in a way that would be
detrimental to law enforcement'in general."' (quoting Robert Fiske, former U.S. Att'y for the
S. Dist. of N.Y.)).
193. See Green, supra note 179, at 76 (noting that the Justice Department may have
developed its internal guidelines on subpoenaing criminal defense lawyers to forestall courts
from adopting Model Rule 3.8(f)); Little, supra note 15, at 744-45 (suggesting the same and
noting that most of the guidelines focus on issues that have been controversial in the past).
For a brief history and overview of the Justice Department's internal guidelines, see Podgor,
supra note 169, at 170-75.
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courts, nor do they create substantive rights for defendants that would allow
them any redress if a prosecutor violated a guideline.194
11. CRITIQUES, DEFENSES, AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ON SCRUTINIZING ADVANCEMENT
Despite the Justice Department's changes to its policy, the debate over
scrutinizing advancement continues. Some commentators believe that the
recent changes will substantially curb the practice. 195  Others express
doubts about whether the changes in the McNulty Memo go far enough 196
or have definitively stated their belief that it does not. 197 Accordingly,
critics have called for passage of the Specter bill, 198 with its full range of
protections and its bar on scrutinizing advancement in all cases. Part II of
this Note explores the debate over government scrutiny of advancement in
greater detail and draws out the inherent prosecutorial ethics-related
implications. First, Part II.A describes the policy arguments underlying the
proposal to bar all scrutiny of advancement, including (1) that scrutinizing
advancement denies individuals access to adequate representation, (2) that
the Justice Department's articulation of its policy undermines the
presumption of innocence, and (3) that the emphasis on cooperation,
including scrutiny of advancement, undermines the adversarial system. Part
IL.A then identifies the ethical concerns that dovetail with those arguments.
Next, Part II.B explains the Justice Department's defense of scrutinizing
advancement in certain cases and its claim that the new policy reflects
194. See Green, supra note 179, at 77; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller,
397 F.3d 964, 974-76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the Justice Department guidelines on
subpoenaing journalists create no substantive rights); McNulty Memo, supra note 111, at
XIII.B (noting that the memorandum does not "create any rights, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal").
195. See Gina Passarella, White-Collar Bar Wants More from Department of Justice,
Legal Intelligencer (Phila.), Dec. 14, 2006, at 1 (citing one white collar defense attorney who
thought that although the McNulty Memo could have gone further he was "more
comfortable" than the ABA's Mathis with the changes to the policy on advancement);
Jonathan Peterson & Kathy M. Kristof, U.S. Eases Its Tactics on Suspect Firms, L.A. Times,
Dec. 13, 2006, at CI (noting that the new policy "stops short of an about-face, but it puts
significant checks on individual prosecutors" (quoting Professor Robert Weisberg, Director
of Stanford University's Criminal Justice Center)).
196. See, e.g., Editorial, The McNulty Memo, supra note 110 ("The book is open.., on
whether the McNulty Memo goes far enough.").
197. See Browning, supra note 109 ("The way the world really works is you have a
prosecutor who says 'I can't ask you to... not pay fees,' ... [b]ut the message to you, the
company, might be 'Well, if we do that, we might just score some brownie points."' (quoting
Robert Bennett, who represented KPMG during the events at issue in Stein)); Press Release,
ABA, Statement by ABA President Karen J. Mathis Regarding Revisions to the Justice
Department's Thompson Memorandum (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter ABA Press Release on
McNulty Memo], available at
http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/statement/statement.cfm?releaseid=59; Press Release,
Ass'n of Corporate Counsel, DOJ's "McNulty Memorandum" Falls Short on Prosecutorial
Reforms, Says Association of Corporate Counsel (Dec. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.acca.com/php/cms/index.php?id=34&action=item&itemid=20061212_1402.
198. See ABA Press Release on McNulty Memo, supra note 197.
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prosecutors' practice of applying scrutiny only in rare situations. Part II.B
then describes the ethical obligations underlying those claims.
A. Critics of Scrutinizing Advancement Cite Public Policy Problems,
Revealing Prosecutorial Ethics Concerns
1. Scrutiny of Advancement Interferes with Access to Competent
Representation
One critique of scrutinizing advancement is that, by limiting or
preventing an organization from making money available to employees for
legal costs, the practice denies those employees access to adequate
representation. The ABA, echoing criticisms of the Stein court, 199 has
pointed out that in a white collar criminal investigation, the accused must
spend significant amounts of money to put on a defense.20 0 One reason for
the substantial cost is that such cases involve lengthy investigations and
trials, with large numbers of documents and depositions. For example, in
Stein, the defendants faced 5 million to 6 million pages of documents
produced in discovery, 335 deposition transcripts, 195 income tax returns,
and more than a 1000 pages of pretrial motions in a trial that the court
estimated would last at least six months. 20' Another reason white collar
crime cases are expensive is that they involve highly complex corporate and
financial transactions. 20 2 To competently represent defendants in such
cases, counsel must have special skills, business sophistication, and
resources, and they will charge clients accordingly. 20 3 For those reasons,
the Stein court estimated that a defendant might need to spend "$500,000 to
$1 million, if not significantly more. ' '2° 4 Indeed, press accounts have
revealed that in extraordinary white collar cases, defense costs may be
199. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 362 n.163 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
200. See Recommendation 302B, supra note 91, at III n.30.
201. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362 & n.163. But see Margulies, supra note 34, at 56 n.192
(noting that although white collar criminal defense usually is expensive, exceptions exist,
including Stein, which involved only a modest number of "key" documents and a fraud
committed in "cookie-cutter" fashion); see also id. at 28-29 (suggesting that defense costs
need not be so high if corporate clients or insurers exerted pressure on attorneys not to pad
their bills).
202. See Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338 n.13; Recommendation 302B, supra note 91, at III
n.30.
203. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338 n.13; see Christopher Palmeri, The Sky-High Cost of
Skilling's Defense, Bus. Wk. Online, Oct. 23, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15348845 (noting that one lawyer on the defense team of
former Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling charged nearly $800 an hour for his services); cf
Lynnley Browning, Judges Press Companies that Cut Off Legal Fees, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17,
2006, at CI ("Less money for legal fees.., means sifting through fewer papers in search of
evidence, doing less case research, filing fewer motions, hiring fewer expert witnesses, doing
fewer background checks and not hiring trial consultants.").
204. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362 n.163; see also Koppel, supra note 88 (quoting John
Hasnas, a professor at Georgetown University's McDonough School of Business, who
stated, "'It is hard to defend a white-collar case for less than $100,000, and most cost much,
much more than that"').
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considerably higher. 20 5 The Stein court and others have pointed out that
many individuals lack the resources to pay for such a defense,20 6 or for an
appeal if convicted. 20 7 Accordingly, the ABA has claimed that employees
rely on their employer organizations to fund their defenses. 20 8
Government consideration of advancement in charging decisions,
however, can put pressure on organizations to limit or deny those payments,
according to the ABA.20 9  Many commentators have noted that an
indictment can cause serious damage to an organization. 210 For example,
prosecutors' decision to indict accounting firm Arthur Andersen practically
destroyed it, reducing it from a firm with 28,000 employees in the United
States and 90,000 worldwide to one with a staff of only 200 people. 21"
Commentators have further noted that despite such effects, prosecutors have
virtually unlimited discretion to indict an organization. 212 Consequently,
these commentators believe that, when prosecutors present an organization
with the possibility of indictment, they compel the company to cooperate
with an investigation.2 13 To determine what they must do to cooperate,
205. See Palmeri, supra note 203 (noting that the defense for former Enron CEO Jeffrey
Skilling reached $70 million).
206. United States v. Stein, 461 F. Supp. 2d 201, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (denial of
defendants' motion for a continuance) ("While it appears that some of the KPMG
Defendants may be well off, there is a real and growing possibility that some and perhaps all
lack funds necessary to [pay for] their defense.").
207. See Browning, supra note 203.
208. See Recommendation 302B, supra note 91, at III (noting that "[elven for those
employees who can afford a lawyer, it will often be difficult if not impossible to afford a
lawyer" with the right expertise and capacity unless their employer pays the fees),
209. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
210. See Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, supra note 95, at 85 ("[C]riminal
indictments of entire companies . . . effectively result[] in the liquidation of the entire firm;
with this comes the attendant disruption of the lives of many employees and stakeholders
who are totally innocent of wrongdoing."); Jonathan D. Glater & Alexei Barrionuevo,
Decision Rekindles Debate Over Andersen Indictment, N.Y. Times, June 1, 2005, at C 1; Has
the Government Gone Too Far?, supra note 98 (statement of Andrew Hrusksa, former Chief
Assistant U.S. Att'y, U.S. Dep't of Justice, E. Dist. of N.Y., and former Senior Counsel to
former Deputy Att'y Gen. Thompson, U.S. Dep't of Justice) (noting that an indictment can
cause "negative publicity, revocation of debts, [and] debarment from government business,"
sending an organization into a "death spiral").
211. Glater & Barrioneuvo, supra note 210.
212. See Has the Government Gone Too Far?, supra note 98 (statement of Andrew
Hrusksa, former Chief Assistant U.S. Att'y, U.S. Dep't of Justice, E. Dist. of N.Y., and
former Senior Counsel to former Deputy Att'y Gen. Thompson, U.S. Dep't of Justice) ("The
only check on a prosecutor's discretion to indict a company is the vote of a grand jury, which
has never constituted a serious impediment to a prosecutor who has a decent case of criminal
wrongdoing by company officers."); see also Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of
Grand Jury Independence, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (2004) (noting that the grand jury
does not provide a meaningful check on prosecutors).
213. See Wray & Hur, supra note 36, at 1170 (citing N. Richard Janis, Deputizing
Company Counsel as Agents of the Federal Government: How Our Adversary System of
Justice Is Being Destroyed, Wash. Law., Mar. 2005, at 32, 44); Has the Government Gone
Too Far?, supra note 98 (statement of David Pitofsky, former Principal Deputy Chief,
Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, E. Dist. of N.Y.) ("The Thompson Memo is a tool-a
crowbar-that prosecutors can use to convert companies into agents of the state."); see also
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organizations will look to the government's policy, and if they see that
paying employees' attorneys' fees may be considered a sign of
noncooperation, then they will try to limit or altogether deny those
payments. 214
While the ABA has acknowledged the legitimacy of the general principle
that the government may use the threat of prosecution to compel
cooperation, 2 15 it has faulted the government for linking its policy on
advancement to its determination to charge an organization. 2 16 The ABA
has claimed that when the government scrutinizes advancement as part of
its evaluation of an organization's cooperation, it pressures the organization
into decisions that deny its employees access to attorneys with the capacity
and acumen required to defend them effectively in a white collar crime
proceeding. 2 17 Indeed, some observers have suggested that the cost of a
defense in a corporate crime investigation is so daunting that some
individuals choose not to put on a defense at all and instead plead guilty.2 18
Thus, government scrutiny of advancement can interfere with the payments,
reducing or eliminating individuals' access to the kind of counsel that they
may need to mount an adequate defense.
2. The Government Policy's Terminology Undermines the Presumption of
Innocence
Critics have also charged that the way that the Justice Department
articulates its policy on scrutinizing advancement undermines the
presumption of innocence. These critics have faulted the government's
policy for allowing prosecutors to examine "a corporation's promise of
support to culpable employees and agents... through the advancing of
attorneys fees." 2 19 That language regarding "culpable" employees, which
appeared in the Thompson Memo, appears in similar form in the McNulty
Memo. Specifically, the new policy states that although prosecutors
generally should not consider advancement except in certain cases, in such
cases "advancement is considered with many other telling facts to make a
determination that the corporation is acting improperly to shield itself and
its culpable employees from government scrutiny. '2 20 The ABA has
Hasnas, supra note 149, at 627 (noting that the Sentencing Guidelines turn an organization
into an "auxiliary" in the prosecution of its individual employees).
214. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that
because of the "threat to the firm inherent in the Thompson Memorandum," KPMG sought
to deny advancement to its employees, contrary to its normal policy of paying those fees).
215. See Recommendation 302B, supra note 91, at II.
216. See id. at III.
217. See id. (noting that prosecutor scrutiny of advancement causes organizations to make
decisions that limit or deprive employees of support and resources for their defense).
218. Cohen & Davies, supra note 3 (reporting that some observers believed that former
Enron accountant Richard Causey pled guilty because he lacked the $20 million that his
lawyers estimated that it would cost to defend him).
219. Thompson Memo, supra note 45, at VI.B.
220. McNulty Memo, supra note 111, at VII.B.3 n.3.
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criticized the use the word "culpable," noting that the government provides
no definition of the term.2 21 Moreover, the ABA has claimed that before
prosecutors bring charges or the organization has completed its internal
investigation, it may not be clear which employees are culpable.
222
Consequently, in determining whether an employee is "culpable" and thus
off limits for advancement, organizations may "feel compelled either to
defer to the government investigators' initial judgment or to err on the side
of caution."223  The ABA has argued that it is "inconsistent with the
presumption of innocence" for the government to put organizations in this
position.224
Additionally, critics have charged that organizations, eager to appease
prosecutors, "hesitate to advance attorneys' fees and costs to individual
employee-defendants for fear of appearing to 'protect[] [their] culpable
employees,"' 225 even where the facts do not warrant an organization's
negative treatment of its employees. 226 In other words, the policy pressures
organizations to avoid supporting employees where no facts lead the
organizations themselves to believe that their employees broke the law but
where the organizations believe that the employees "appear" culpable to
prosecutors. Indeed, the Stein court described this same problem when it
observed that the Thompson Memo gave KPMG an incentive to find that it
had no legal obligation to advance fees to the defendants, because
prosecutors' skepticism of the firm's finding such an obligation would
likely lead to an indictment and the organization's doom.227 Similarly,
some critics have charged that where the policy pressures companies to
make early determinations about employees' culpability, it not only
encourages organizations to withhold support, it exacerbates a natural
tendency for them actively to scapegoat one or more employees. 228 While
organizations looking to avoid prosecution may already have an incentive
to "heap scorn, fairly or unfairly, on one or a few employees," the
221. See Recommendation 302B, supra note 91, at III n.19.
222. Id. at III.
223. Id. at II n.19.
224. Id. at VI n.44.
225. Wray & Hur, supra note 36, at 1181 (alterations in original) (quoting Thompson
Memo, supra note 45, at VIA).
226. See id. at 1182; see also Hasnas, supra note 149, at 626 (noting that an organization
may be denied cooperation credit "if it advances the legal fees of an employee the
government regards as guilty").
227. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Few if any
competent defense lawyers would advise a corporate client at risk of indictment that it
should feel free to advance legal fees to individuals in the face of the language of the
Thompson Memorandum itself' because "[i]t would be irresponsible to take the chance that
prosecutors might view it as 'protecting ... culpable employees and agents."').
228. See Wray & Hur, supra note 36, at 1182 (citing Dale A. Oesterle, Early
Observations on the Prosecutions of the Business Scandals of 2002-03: On Sideshow
Prosecutions, Spitzer's Clash With Donaldson Over Turf the Choice of Civil or Criminal
Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 443, 479-80
(2004)); Has the Government Gone Too Far?, supra note 98 (statement of David Pitofsky,
former Principal Deputy Chief, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, E. Dist. of N.Y.).
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government policy's emphasis on "culpable" employees may have taken
"what was previously an ad hoc corporate strategy-find someone to
'throw under the bus'-and codified it as an essential step to corporate
survival." 22
9
Thus, the critics believe that the language in the government's policy
creates or increases incentives for an organization to label employees
"culpable" before gathering all the facts, and possibly even in contradiction
to the employees' apparent innocence. Plus, they charge that the policy, as
stated, may increase or regularize the tendency of some organizations to
foist the blame for widespread misconduct onto the shoulders of a few
employees, making these scapegoats appear more culpable then they would
otherwise appear. Those results, the critics have claimed, "stand[] the
presumption of innocence principle on its head. '230
3. The Emphasis on Cooperation, Including Scrutiny of Advancement,
Undermines the Adversarial System
A third criticism of the government's scrutiny of advancement is that, as
a component of the overall policy emphasizing organizations' cooperation,
it undermines the adversarial system of justice. For example, one critic
characterized the scrutiny of advancement discussed in Stein as one piece of
evidence that the government sought a form of "full cooperation" that
aligned the organization with the government and against employees. 23 1
Others have taken up the same theme, asserting that the emphasis on
cooperation gives the government "too much power, ' '232 and noting that
where the government's power overwhelms defendants it threatens the
adversarial system.2 33
Commentators have cited three aspects of the government's policy that
create such a power imbalance. First, they have noted that scrutiny of
advancement leads organizations to withhold it from employees who need
it, decreasing the resources available to them to mount a defense. 234
Second, critics have explained how focusing on cooperation in determining
whether to indict-as the McNulty Memo does2 35 and as the Thompson
229. See Has the Government Gone Too Far?, supra note 98 (statement of David
Pitofsky, former Principal Deputy Chief, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, E. Dist. of
N.Y.).
230. Thompson Memo Hearings, supra note 52, at 93 (statement of Karin J. Mathis,
President, ABA). The policy's language may also create unfairness. See Duggin, supra note
53, at 914 ("While few would suggest that protection of 'culpable' employees is appropriate,
punishment or termination of an employee simply because a third party-whether a co-
worker, prosecutor or agency-views that person as 'culpable' is difficult to square with
basic notions of fairness.").
231. See Janis, supra note 213, at 35.
232. Wray & Hur, supra note 36, at 1170 (characterizing a concern of critics of the
Thompson Memo).
233. See id. at 1145 (explaining this phenomenon in the context of deferred prosecution
agreements).
234. See supra Part II.A. 1.
235. McNulty Memo, supra note 111, at VII.
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Memo before it did 236-- has the effect of increasing the resources available
to the government. 237 Because indictments can damage an organization so
severely, 238 most organizations will cooperate with the government to avoid
being charged.239 To cooperate, organizations will likely launch their own
internal investigations to uncover culpable employees and turn that
information over to prosecutors. 240 As a result, a policy's emphasis on
cooperation and threat of indictment allows the government to deputize
organizations to join the prosecution team.241 "A corporate employee
caught in the crosshairs of a corporate fraud investigation [must] fight
against the resources of the U.S. government and.., a major U.S.
corporation. The combined firepower of both against a single person is
awesome." 242  In other words, they argue that a policy that emphasizes
cooperation significantly augments the government's power.
Third, critics have noted that other provisions of the government's policy
regarding cooperation disadvantage individuals. Those critics pointed to
provisions in the Thompson Memo-provisions that the McNulty Memo
retained-that instruct prosecutors assessing an organization's cooperation
to consider the organization's assistance to employees in preparing a
defense, its retention of such employees without sanction for their
misconduct, and its sharing information about the government investigation
with the employees as part of a joint defense agreement.243 They noted that
such provisions create incentives for the organization to fire or otherwise
punish the employees and to withhold from the employees information
about the investigation. 244  Furthermore, critics have noted that the
government's consideration of an organization's waiver of its attorney-
client and work product protections creates an incentive for the entity to
reveal employee statements to the government. 245 Thus, the policy might
236. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
237. See Wray & Hur, supra note 36, at 1170.
238. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
240. See Hasnas, supra note 149, at 629-30 (noting that the Thompson Memo created
pressure for companies to turn over incriminating information to the government); supra
note 47.
241. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
242. Has the Government Gone Too Far?, supra note 98 (statement of David Pitofsky,
former Principal Deputy Chief, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, E. Dist. of N.Y.).
243. See Duggin, supra note 53, at 904; Hasnas, supra note 149, at 626.
244. See Duggin, supra note 53, at 904-05; Hasnas, supra note 149, at 626 (noting that
even an organization that complies with one provision of the Thompson Memo may still fail
to win cooperation credit if it fails to fire an employee whom the government considers
guilty, or cooperates with such an employee in preparing a defense).
245. See Hasnas, supra note 149, at 625 (noting that the waiver of the organization's
attomey-client privilege permits the government to obtain statements of possible targets and
that prosecutors' control of cooperation credit often leaves organizations little choice but to
accede to waiver requests (citing David M. Zomow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a
Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 147, 154 (2000)).
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deny employees the protection of the organization's privilege, further
reducing their leverage in an investigation and following proceedings.
In sum, critics have charged that the advancement provision contributes
directly to the power imbalance between the government and individuals by
stripping resources from employees, 246 and that the advancement provision
acts together with other parts of the government's policy further to
undermine defendants' position and augment the government's own
resources. An emphasis on full cooperation allows the government to
"stack the deck against individual defendants," 247 and such a discrepancy
can undermine the adversarial system.248 One commentator noted that
while this result may not lead to injustice for the "clearly guilty," who
should be convicted, or the "clearly innocent," who will be acquitted no
matter the resources stacked against them, there is an "extremely broad
middle section" of defendants or potential defendants who may be
prejudiced by the imbalance. 249
4. Public Policy Critiques of Advancement Reveal Ethics Concerns
An examination of critics' public policy arguments against scrutinizing
advancement reveals several ethical considerations. For example, if the
claims that such scrutiny denies individuals access to adequate
representation 250 and undermines the adversarial system251 are viewed in
light of the prosecutorial ethics framework,252 it appears that the
government's consideration of attorneys' fee payments conflicts with
prosecutors' obligations in some ways. First, prosecutors have some
responsibility to ensure defendants' access to competent counsel, 253 but
since scrutinizing fee payments denies individuals' ability to pay for an
adequate defense, 254  such scrutiny seems to interfere with that
responsibility. Second, the duty to seek justice impels prosecutors to
achieve "adversarially valid results," 255 but the government's policy on
advancement creates a dramatic power imbalance that runs counter to such
adversarial validity-it reduces individuals' resources and disadvantages
their defenses256  while increasing the government's resources. 257
Specifically, even though some of the accused are "clearly guilty," 258 for
246. See supra Part II.A. 1.
247. Wray & Hur, supra note 36, at 1145.
248. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
249. Has the Government Gone Too Far?, supra note 98 (statement of David Pitofsky,
former Principal Deputy Chief, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, E. Dist. of N.Y.).
250. See supra Part II.A. 1.
251. See supra Part II.A.3.
252. See supra Part I.C. 1-2.
253. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
256. See supra Part II.A. 1; supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 237-42 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
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the government, with its superior resources, to convict these individuals
may be factually fair but adversarially invalid.
The duty to seek justice requires prosecutors to represent the
sovereign, 259 but the power discrepancy undermines that goal as well, for
several reasons. One reason is that the sovereign should not punish the
innocent,260 but the resource imbalance may lead to convictions of those
who are innocent but not "clearly" so: In some cases their defenses may be
inadequate at trial, 261 and in other cases they may plead guilty rather than
try to prove their innocence. 262 Moreover, prosecutors have a responsibility
to preserve the perception of fair process,263 but the scale of the imbalance
created by the policy on advancement 264 undermines the representation of
the government as a just sovereign. Thus, ethical concerns about achieving
adversarially valid results and about preserving actual and apparent
procedural fairness support the critics' policy arguments about the dangers
of government scrutiny of advancement.
The effect of the Justice Department's policy on the presumption of
innocence also implicates ethical considerations. First, by undermining the
presumption of innocence, 265 the government is more likely to punish the
innocent, 266 which the sovereign has a duty not to do.267 Furthermore, to
the extent that prosecutors do undermine the innocence presumption, they
erode one of the foundations of procedural fairness,268 which they have a
responsibility to uphold. Moreover, by impeding advancement, prosecutors
may appear to be usurping the court's role in determining guilt or innocence
by seeking to "punish those whom [the prosecutors themselves] deem
culpable." 269 Thus, even if a court ultimately convicted an individual who
was denied fee advancement, the prosecutor, by having earlier "punished"
the individual, might have created an appearance that the investigative and
adjudicative process was unfair. Accordingly, ethical considerations
regarding the importance of procedural fairness reveal that the Justice
Department's articulation of its policy conflicts with prosecutors' ethical
obligations.
259. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
261. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[T]he
innocent need substantial resources to minimize the chance of an unjust indictment and
conviction.").
262. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
265. See supra Part II.A.2.
266. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
269. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (deeming such
conduct "an abuse of power" and without a legitimate government interest).
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B. Defenders of Scrutinizing Advancement Cite Policy Justifications and
Practical Considerations, Revealing Ethics Obligations
1. The Danger of Stonewalling Justifies Scrutiny of Advancement
The Justice Department's policy reflects the government's position that it
needs to be able to scrutinize the payment of attorneys' fees to determine if
the money is being used to protect culpable employees in an attempt to
thwart an investigation. 270 To explain this concern, the government has
argued that "the payment of legal fees to employees can be one aspect of a
corporation impeding an investigation where the corporation 'circles the
wagons' by, among other things, essentially muffling relevant corporate
witnesses and controlling the flow of information to the [g]overnment. ' '271
Scholars note that drug rings and criminal syndicates are not the only
organizations to engage in such obstruction; corporations may do so as
well. 272
According to these scholars, stonewalling may occur in different
scenarios and through different mechanisms. For example, where the
organization retains or refers the attorney who will represent its employees,
the organization may purposefully select a lawyer who will discourage
employees from cooperating with the government. 273 Indeed, scholars have
given the following example regarding the case against financier Michael
Milken:
When considering which lawyers to recruit to represent potential
witnesses in the Milken case, "[m]ore important" than the "lawyers' skills
and reputations ... were the lawyers' track records in government cases.
[Lawyers for Milken's company] wanted lawyers whose strong
philosophical preference was to fight the government rather than
cooperate with it."'2 74
Even where the organization does not select the lawyer and merely
provides referrals, scholars have noted that stonewalling may occur. For
example, an organization may maintain a network of lawyers whose interest
in continuing to receive referrals inclines them to recommend against
employees' cooperation with the government, even when cooperation might
be better for the employees. 275 When criminal organizations are involved,
an employee's acceptance of a lawyer "hand-picked by the organization,"
along with subsidies for the lawyers' fees, can signal the employee's loyalty
270. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
271. Government's Memorandum, supra note 81, at 4-5.
272. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
274. Richman, supra note 34, at 123 n.188 (omission and first alteration in original)
(quoting Stewart, supra note 35, at 314-15).
275. See Margulies, supra note 34, at 25-26; see also Richman, supra note 34, at 126
(describing a theoretical "white-collar attorney who hopes for more referrals and fees from
the target corporation or lawyers to whom she owes her employment" and thus serves the
corporation's interests over those of the employee she was hired to represent).
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to the criminal enterprise, and thus raises the risk that the acceptance is "a
pre-commitment device that hinders the individual's ability to inform on his
colleagues." 276  Indeed, one press account noted that in some cases the
government suspects that lawyers may have had incentives not to uncover
or not to report evidence of wrongdoing. 277 Thus, where organizations
provide not only advance fees, but also choose or provide a referral for the
lawyer who represents the employee, there is a greater opportunity for
stonewalling.
While commentators have focused on provision of counsel and referrals
and on attempts to protect the organization itself, the Justice Department
has stated its concerns more broadly:
[A] corporation's advancement of legal fees can concern prosecutors
where that fact, taken with other facts, gives rise to a real concern that the
corporation is "circling the wagons," or, in other words, is using or
conditioning the payment of attorneys' fees as a tool to limit or prevent
the communication of truthful information from current and former
employees to the government, in order to protect either the employees or
the corporation itself.278
In other words, however an organization uses the payment of fees to limit
employee disclosures, such payments raise real concerns. Plus, while in
some cases the organization may stonewall for its own benefit, in other
cases the organization may use its resources not to protect "itself' but to
protect "the employees" under investigation.
Whatever the reasons and mechanisms for stonewalling, at least one
court has recognized that "corporate [stonewalling] no doubt occur[s]. ' '279
Where it does occur, one scholar notes that it impedes access to accurate
and complete information, without which the government cannot fully
assess the scope of misconduct that is the focus of its investigation.280
Moreover, according to the Justice Department, the need to ensure that
executives do not escape justice was particularly acute in the wake of recent
276. Margulies, supra note 34, at 25.
277. See James Bandler & Kara Scannell, In Options Probes, Private Law Firms Play
Crucial Role, Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 2006, at Al (reporting that the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) launched a system to track, among other things, how "independent" the
government believed the private lawyers conducting probes of companies had been, which
would help the government "judge [the] credibility" of the lawyers' findings). The press
report described one investigation involving potential backdating of stock option grants that
prompted SEC concern. Id. There, a statistical analysis concluded that the odds were 300
billion to one that the company's grants had been randomly selected, but when the company
"used its longtime outside counsel to conduct the probe," the lawyers reported "that there
was no intentional backdating to enrich executives." Id.
278. Thompson Memo Hearings, supra note 52, at 120 (statement of Paul J. McNulty,
Deputy Att'y Gen. of the United States).
279. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (likening the
phenomenon to the Watergate case, "in which the legal fees of individuals who broke into
the offices of the Democratic National Committee were paid, along with other 'hush money,'
to buy the silence of the burglars and to protect higher-ups").
280. Duggin, supra note 53, at 893.
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corporate scandals, because "the American public needed to know that a
CEO or a CFO of a Fortune 500 company was not immune from
prosecution because of his wealth, position, or friends," 281 and that the
American judicial system is not one "where a pickpocket who steals 50
dollars faces more jail time than a CEO who steals 50 million dollars." 282
In other words, in the face of enormous corporate crime, prosecutors need
to ferret out the facts and cannot allow organizations to shield culpable
employees. Thus, scholars recognize that prosecutors have a legitimate
interest in uncovering the truth and, therefore, are "justifiably wary" of
attempts to shield culpable actors. 283 Indeed, Judge Kaplan, although
finding fault with the wording of the Justice Department's policy and
prosecutors' implementation of it in Stein, acknowledged that no one would
"suggest that an entity's obstruction of a government investigation-what
the government has called 'circling the wagons'-should be ignored in a
charging decision." 284
2. Prosecutors Scrutinize Advancement Only Rarely and Only as One
Factor Among Many
While the Justice Department has argued that prosecutors must retain
discretion to scrutinize advancement, it claims that prosecutors never
exercised their discretion to apply scrutiny except in rare cases, and it
claims that the new policy mandates such a sparing use of the practice. 285
McNulty, in announcing the new policy, noted that it reduces prosecutors'
discretion to take advancement into account, generally prohibiting
prosecutors from considering it except in extremely rare cases. 286 He
claimed that this bottom-line standard made explicit what prosecutors had
been doing under the Thompson Memo, saying: "Let me emphasize this-
281. Thompson Memo Hearings, supra note 52, at 110 (statement of Paul J. McNulty,
Deputy Att'y Gen. of the United States); see also Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Prepared Remarks at the Lawyers for Civil Justice Membership Conference
Regarding the Department's Charging Guidelines in Corporate Fraud Prosecutions (Dec. 12,
2006) [hereinafter McNulty, Remarks on McNulty Memo], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/dag-speech-061212.htm (claiming the Justice
Department's response to the public outcry over the Enron scandal and contemporary
widespread, large-scale corporate frauds "reflected the duty [that prosecutors] owe to the
American public," including the duty "to enforce the law").
282. Thompson Memo Hearings, supra note 52, at 110 (statement of Paul J. McNulty,
Deputy Att'y Gen. of the United States) (quoting Penalties for White Collar Crime:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 261 (2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary));
see also McNulty, Remarks on McNulty Memo, supra note 281 (noting that in carrying out
their duty to enforce the laws against corporate fraud, "prosecutors ... are committed to the
fair administration of justice and equal treatment under the law").
283. Duggin, supra note 53, at 893; see also Margulies, supra note 34, at 56
("[P]rosecutors act appropriately when they set conditions of cooperation for collective
entities that are reasonably related to the goals of promoting thorough investigations .....
284. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 363 (footnote omitted).
285. McNulty, Remarks on McNulty Memo, supra note 281.
286. Id.
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the advancement of attorneys' fees has always been a rare consideration in
our corporate prosecutions. '287  He explicitly based his claim on the
provisions in the McNulty Memo and in the Thompson Memo prohibiting
the government from scrutinizing advancement where organizations had
state law or contractual obligations to pay attorneys' fees under state law.288
Specifically, he argued that "[b]ecause corporations often do have these
[obligations] which have been construed.by courts to provide advancement
and indemnification, fee advancement could be, and was, considered
rarely." 289 In other words, the government argues that it has, and always
had, limited discretion to scrutinize advancement, since there are few
situations in which advancement is not required by law and thus where it is
immune from government scrutiny.
Additionally, where legal requirements do not immunize advancement
from government scrutiny, the government has noted that it still may only
consider the advancement as one factor among many that may indicate
attempts to impede an investigation. Prior to the adoption of the McNulty
Memo, the Justice Department pointed out that its policy on fee
advancement did not constitute "a blanket [g]overnment statement that a
corporation's payment of legal fees will be weighed negatively in the
charging decision."290  To the contrary, the government claimed that
prosecutors worry about advancement only when it occurs in combination
with other factors that may indicate noncooperation. 291 Such factors would
include "[an organization's] overly broad assertions of corporate
representation of its employees, a refusal to sanction wrongdoers, a failure
to comply with document subpoenas and a failure to preserve
documents." 292  In addition, McNulty suggested that, where an
organization's advancement policy was not "applied consistently" to all
employees, it would raise concerns. 293 On the other hand, he claimed that,
where advancement did not occur in combination with those other
287. Id. Indeed, the Justice Department has characterized the McNulty Memo as
"clariffying] the intent of the Thompson Memorandum." Id.
288. Id. In his remarks, McNulty incorrectly stated that the Thompson Memo
"specifically stated that where there was a legal or contractual obligation to advance fees,
prosecutors could not consider that factor." Id. In fact, the Thompson Memo had no such
provision regarding contractual obligations; it only prohibited scrutiny of advancement
where the advancement was required by state law. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
The McNulty Memo, by contrast, does specifically prohibit taking advancement into account
when either state law provisions or contractual obligations require an organization to
advance attorneys' fees. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
289. McNulty, Remarks on McNulty Memo, supra note 281.
290. Government's Memorandum, supra note 81, at 5; see also Thompson Memo
Hearings, supra note 52, at 119-20 (statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen. of the
United States) (noting that advancement "is a small part of the overall assessment as to
whether a corporation cooperated" and that advancement will not count against an
organization absent other circumstances indicating a pattern of noncooperation).
291. See Thompson Memo Hearings, supra note 52, at 120 (statement of Paul J. McNulty,
Deputy Att'y Gen. of the United States).
292. Id.
293. Id.
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circumstances, the payments would not indicate stonewalling. 294 Indeed,
commentators have noted that under the Thompson Memo, prosecutors did
not always challenge the cooperation of organizations that advanced
attorneys' fees.295
While McNulty made those claims in reference to the Thompson Memo,
he has recently claimed that the McNulty Memo uses the same approach,
actually formalizing it into a requirement. Specifically, he described the
McNulty Memo provision as follows:
[F]ee advancement can be considered where the totality of the
circumstances show[s] that it was intended to impede a government
investigation.
As a practical matter, this factor is never considered alone. It is always
combined with other telling facts to show that the corporation is
attempting to shield itself and its culpable employees. 296
Further, McNulty emphasized that the situations in which "[c]orporations
may use advancement, and other methods, to stop the flow of information
from the company to the government so that [the government] cannot
investigate the conduct effectively . . . [are] very, very rare. 297
Additionally, he explained that "prosecutors must come to me for approval
before they can consider [advancement] in charging decisions. '29 8 In short,
McNulty emphasized that the Justice Department's new policy places
safeguards on advancement to protect it from scrutiny except in limited
circumstances.
Commentators have noted that the changes to the policy do limit
prosecutors' ability to take advancement into account. For example, a
former Deputy Attorney General who advised McNulty on the creation of
the new guidelines characterized the McNulty Memo as imposing "a
bottom-line standard saying it's [not] appropriate to [scrutinize
advancement] except in extremely limited circumstances. '299 Moreover,
294. Id.
295. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, Judge's Rebuke Prompts New Rules for Prosecutors,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2006, at C4 (reporting that prosecutors did not object to payment of
attorneys' fees by one company to employees caught up in the investigation and that the
government allowed the company to enter into a DPA); Cohen & Davies, supra note 3
(noting that the government did not challenge Computer Associates' cooperation with a
fraud investigation, despite the company's decision to cover legal costs for some employees
charged in the case). Although KPMG advanced attorneys' fees to several employees, the
government ultimately signed a DPA with the firm. See supra note 79 and accompanying
text.
296. McNulty, Remarks on McNulty Memo, supra note 281.
297. Id. Indeed, McNulty also told the press that under the new policy, "prosecutors are
only supposed to weigh the decision to pay legal fees if the firm engages in a 'pattern of
obstruction."' Editorial, The McNulty Memo, supra note 110.
298. McNulty, Remarks on McNulty Memo, supra note 281.
299. Browning, supra note 295 (reporting that the adviser, whose counsel McNulty called
"especially significant" in developing his new policy, recommended that McNulty use the
"bottom-line standard" to avoid having to create "a list of all-inclusive criteria about the
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one scholar suggested that a process requiring approval from the Deputy
Attorney General may act as a practical deterrent, because young
prosecutors will not be comfortable seeking approval from someone so
senior. 300  Indeed, one commentator characterized the new policy's
substantive and procedural checks as "significant." '301
3. Defenses of Scrutinizing Advancement Reveal Ethics Obligations
Just as the prosecutorial ethics framework sheds light on the arguments
against scrutinizing advancement, that framework also reveals
considerations inherent in the arguments supporting the government's
policy. Indeed, several ethical considerations are implicit in the arguments
about scrutinizing advancement to ensure that the payments do not facilitate
stonewalling. For example, the duty to seek justice requires prosecutors to
punish wrongdoers, 302 and it may require them to enforce the law
strenuously. 303 Where crime has actually occurred, however, stonewalling
keeps prosecutors' from fulfilling that duty, since it impedes their ability to
uncover the truth and punish the guilty.30 4 Moreover, the payment of
attorneys' fees can be, and sometimes is, used in furtherance of a criminal
conspiracy. 30 5 In such cases, the money may be subject to forfeiture, as in
Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto.306 If so, prosecutors' scrutiny of
advancement, and any consequent denial of advancement by the
organization, would not violate the right to counsel.
The Justice Department's attempt to prevent stonewalling in the
corporate context may reflect other important ethical priorities of
prosecutors. The public expects its government to prosecute corporate
crime.307  In the wake of large-scale corporate fraud, that duty is
particularly pressing. 308 Plus, in representing the sovereign, prosecutors
must honor the public's expectation that similarly situated criminals be
treated equally and must ensure that punishments are proportional to the
crimes committed. 30 9 When corporate crime is widespread, the public's
faith in the justice system depends in part on seeing that corporate criminals
circumstances where it would be appropriate" to scrutinize fee payments (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
300. See John Coffee Says McNulty Memo Went a Bridge Too Far in Tying Hands of
Prosecutors in Corporate Crime Investigations, Corp. Crime Rep., Jan. 1, 2007, at 1, 16
(noting that the process for obtaining approval for waiver requests, the same process required
to take advancement into account, will discourage junior prosecutors from seeking that
approval (citing Columbia Law School Professor John Coffee)).
301. Peterson & Kristof, supra note 195 (quoting Professor Robert Weisberg, Director of
Stanford University's Criminal Justice Center).
302. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
303. Cf supra note 128 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 271-77 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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are prosecuted and receive sentences in proportion to their crimes, 3 10 but
stonewalling could allow white collar criminals to avoid some or all
criminal liability. 3 11 If prosecutors allowed that to occur, they might send
the message to the public that the government treats corporate criminals
more leniently than other wrongdoers and does not actually punish
corporate criminals or does not punish them in proportion to the magnitude
of their crimes. Indeed, McNulty's testimony to the Senate Judiciary
Committee implied that, by failing in these responsibilities, prosecutors fail
to preserve the American public's perception that its criminal justice system
is fair.3 12 Prosecutors' ethical responsibility to represent the sovereign
compels them to avoid these results.
III. ON BALANCE, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FAVOR THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT'S POSITION, BUT THE MCNULTY MEMO NEEDS FURTHER
CLARIFICATION
Part III evaluates the considerations raised in Part II in light of the ethics
framework raised in Part I to shed new light on the debate over scrutinizing
advancement. Part III.A balances the considerations and concludes that
allowing prosecutors to retain discretion to consider advancement is
consistent with the requirements and limits of prosecutorial ethics. Part
III.B suggests that the Specter bill's blanket prohibition on scrutinizing
advancement should not be adopted. Part III.C argues that the recent
changes to the Justice Department's policy allows prosecutors the discretion
they require to carry out their ethical obligations, but it lacks specific
directions for prosecutors in using their discretion. Finally, Part III.D
proposes a change to the Justice Department's policy that would clarify it.
A. The Ethical Considerations and the Context of Prosecutorial Discretion
Suggest that Prosecutors Should Be Able to Scrutinize Advancement in
Some Instances
Examining the ethical issues underlying the policy arguments for and
against scrutinizing advancement reveals that prosecutors face conflicting
ethical responsibilities. On the one hand, scrutinizing advancement may
undermine the presumption of innocence, which could also lead to wrongful
punishment of the innocent and actual and perceived procedural
unfairness. 3 13 To the extent that it does so, such scrutiny interferes with
prosecutors' ability to represent the sovereign and to seek justice.
Additionally, the way that their scrutiny exacerbates the power imbalance
between the government and individual defendants may lead to increased
310. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
312. Cf supra note 282 (commenting that the public's need to know that its justice
system is fair explained the Justice Department's use of all the tools at its disposal, including
scrutinizing advancement).
313. See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
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punishment of the innocent and actual and perceived procedural unfairness,
and it will often lead to adversarially invalid results. 314 These results
impair prosecutors' ability to fulfill their responsibility to act as
representatives of the sovereign. Moreover, the effect of the imbalance on
defendants' access to the type of counsel needed in a white collar crime
case can lead to procedural unfairness and constitutes an encroachment on
the right to competent counsel that may be somewhat at odds with the
policies underlying the ethics codes and some court decisions. 315
On the other hand, three considerations provide a counterweight to those
concerns. First, by taking advancement into consideration when
stonewalling arises, prosecutors increase their ability to uncover facts and,
ultimately, to punish the guilty.316 Seeing that guilty executives do not
escape justice in turn improves the government's ability to ensure equal
treatment of criminals and punishments that are proportional to crimes, and
it helps to restore the public's faith that its sovereign will enforce the law
fairly and without regard to defendants' social status. 317
Second, although the ethics codes place safeguards on the right to
counsel, they also acknowledge exceptions to those safeguards. 318 In some
cases, the government can deprive individuals of funds even if they need
the money to put on a defense. 319  Moreover, while scrutinizing
advancement leads to a power imbalance that encroaches on individuals'
access to competent counsel, the Stein court acknowledged the validity of
the practice when stonewalling occurs.320 Plus, prosecutor scrutiny of
advancement may only partially impinge on an individual's defense. For
example, in Stein, KPMG reacted to the government's scrutiny by capping
advancement at a level that would have provided defendants with forty to
eighty percent of the court's estimate of the cost of a defense.32' Moreover,
although some organizations have a policy of advancing fees, which makes
the money seem clearly legally available to defendants, 322 where no such
policy exists, an organization is free to deny the money. Under such
circumstances, employees would have no right to the money, so conduct by
prosecutors that has the effect of limiting advancement likely would not
violate the right to counsel. 323
Third, the ethical rules recognize that prosecutors should be granted
broad discretion, especially during investigations, 324 where organizations
314. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 250-51, 267-69 and accompanying text.
316. See supra Part II.B.1.
317. See supra notes 306-12 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 156-68 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
321. KPMG capped advancement at $400,000 for most employees. See supra note 72 and
accompanying text. The court estimated the trial's cost to the defendant at $500,000 to $1
million. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
3286 [Vol. 75
2007] PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS AND THE MCNULTY MEMO 3287
often advance attorneys' fees325 and where the payment of fees may be
most important. 326  For example, the practices of using the threat of
prosecution to compel cooperation and of seeking the waiver of important
rights are well established, even though such practices may create hardship
for individuals under investigation and where those individuals lack
expensive legal counsel. 327 Moreover, ethics rules set a low standard for
charging decisions, 328 and where the government scrutinizes advancement
it does so in the context of a charging decision. 329  Thus, weighing
advancement as a factor in determining an organization's cooperation is
consistent with the broad grant of discretion to prosecutors.
While considering advancement in every case would be at odds with
some of prosecutors' ethical responsibilities, prosecutors would not be able
to fulfill other ethical responsibilities if they could not scrutinize
advancement in the cases where corporate stonewalling is likely.
Furthermore, prosecutors' wide discretion in investigating crimes indicates
that the practice is not unethical merely because it may impinge on
individuals' rights to some extent.
B. The Specter Bill Is Inconsistent with Prosecutors' Ethical Obligations
and Standards of Prosecutorial Discretion and Thus Should Not Be
Adopted
The Specter bill contains a provision that would forbid the government
from taking advancement into account in any case. 3 30 Critics charge that
scrutiny of advancement undermines the presumption of innocence,
interferes with access to counsel, and skews the adversarial system; 33 1 of
course, the Specter bill would address all of these public policy concerns by
prohibiting such scrutiny. Moreover, since the critical policy concerns
imply related conflicts between scrutinizing advancement and some of
prosecutors' ethical obligations, 3 32 the legislation also would protect
prosecutors from taking action contrary to those ethical responsibilities.
Specifically, it would eliminate the chance that prosecutors' scrutiny of
advancement would lead to a conviction of an innocent person, or that it
would create adversarially invalid results or the perception of procedural
unfairness because of prejudgment of individuals.
However, such a ban also would prevent prosecutors from fulfilling other
obligations. Specifically, the government should prevent stonewalling, 333
and prosecutors have related ethical obligations, namely to prosecute white
325. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 18.
327. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
331. See supra Part II.A.
332. See supra Part II.A.4.
333. See supra Part II.B. 1.
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collar criminals, to punish those criminals in proportion to their crimes, and
to protect the perception that the criminal justice system is fair. 334 The flat
ban on scrutinizing advancement would prevent prosecutors from carrying
out these duties. Moreover, the established principle of giving prosecutors
leeway to investigate crimes and exercise discretion in charging is well
established. 335  The ban, however, would contravene that established
principle, and it would do so precisely where prosecutors' ability to charge
should be unhampered, namely where an organization is likely using
advancement to shield culpable employees from the law. Accordingly, the
Specter bill should not be implemented in its current form, nor should any
other legislation that includes an absolute ban on taking advancement into
account regardless of whether the advancement was used improperly.
C. The McNulty Memorandum Is More Consistent with Prosecutors'
Ethical Obligations, but It Contains Ambiguity that Undermines Its
Usefulness
Unlike the proposal in the Specter bill, the McNulty Memo proposes
circumscribing prosecutors' ability to scrutinize advancement while still
leaving them discretion to do so in some cases, 336 which is more consistent,
on balance, with policy and ethics considerations. Nonetheless, a careful
reading of the new policy in light of recent Justice Department statements
about how it will be implemented reveals some ambiguity that the
government should correct.
The McNulty Memo goes a long way toward limiting prosecutors' ability
to consider advancement in charging decisions. First, the policy creates a
significant procedural limit on the government's scrutiny of advancement,
allowing prosecutors to take it into account only after receiving approval to
do so from the Deputy Attorney General. 337 Not only does this allow the
Deputy Attorney General to monitor prosecutors' use of discretion on this
issue, but since more junior prosecutors may worry about seeking approval
from someone so senior,338 the approval process likely also deters requests
to scrutinize advancement except where prosecutors can offer a very
compelling case to their supervisors.
Second, the new policy includes several substantive limits on
prosecutors' ability to scrutinize discretion. Like the Thompson Memo, the
new policy flatly prohibits considering advancement where state law
requires the organization to advance fees, but it expands on the prior policy
by recognizing that such obligations can arise through employment
agreements as well as under state laws mandating advancement. 339
Moreover, it states that prosecutors may only take the payment of attorneys'
334. See supra Part II.A.2.
335. See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
337. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
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fees into account in "extremely rare cases," 340 which takes away
prosecutors' discretion to take advancement into account in all but a small
number of situations. Furthermore, to exercise their discretion, prosecutors
can consider the payment of attorneys' fees as a sign of noncooperation
only where it was used to impede an investigation, looking at several
factors in a totality of the circumstances test. 34 1
Accordingly, under the McNulty Memo, prosecutors' discretion to
consider advancement is limited first to the "rare" subset of cases where
organizations are not under a legal or contractual obligation to pay
attorneys' fees 342 and second, within that subset, to the "very, very rare" 343
set of cases where "the totality of the circumstances show[s] that [the
advancement] was intended to impede a criminal investigation. ' 34 4 Thus,
the new policy's substantive and procedural checks on prosecutors' ability
to scrutinize advancement are significant. 345 Those limits in turn help
resolve the policy concerns raised by critics of the government's scrutiny of
advancement and also the ethical concerns about the practice.
Despite the significant checks that the new policy places on prosecutors'
ability to scrutinize advancement, however, the McNulty Memo's wording
and the Justice Department's public comments on its new advancement
provision suggest that prosecutors still can take advancement into account
even where no evidence exists that the advancement itself was used
improperly. There are two reasons why the new policy creates ambiguity.
The first reason is that the totality of the circumstances test does not say
what type of circumstances prosecutors may consider. In describing that
test, the McNulty Memo references the discussion in the government's brief
in United States v. Smith.346 While the discussion in that brief emphasizes
the point that prosecutors are permitted to look at advancement as a sign of
noncooperation only in the context of other facts indicating obstruction, it
does not list any specific conduct prosecutors should look for as evidence
that the organization meant to impede their investigation. 34 7 Indeed, the
Justice Department may have intended not to set forth a bright-line test or
340. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 290-96 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 288-89 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. Instead, the government's brief
focuses on refuting the factual and legal issues that served as the basis for the constitutional,
analysis in the earlier Stein orders. See Brief for the United States of America, supra note
114, at 42-45. The brief does mention some of KPMG's conduct that tends to indicate
stonewalling. See, e.g., id. at 61 (noting that the events at issue in Stein occurred when
KPMG was itself under investigation and had a "well-documented history of impeding or
obstructing other [g]overnment investigations"). However, it does not contain any argument
that KPMG actually used advancement to stonewall'the investigation. See generally id.
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exhaustive list of factors indicating what circumstances would trigger the
exception and allow prosecutors to take advancement into account. 348
The second reason for the policy's ambiguity is that the Justice
Department has not made clear how its policy on advancement specifically
relates to its policy on obstruction of investigations by means other than
advancement. Indeed, McNulty made several public comments about how
the Justice Department implements its policy on advancement that suggest a
link between the advancement provision and the McNulty Memo's
"Obstructing the Investigation" provision.349 In his statement to the Senate
Judiciary Committee on the Thompson Memo, McNulty claimed that
prosecutors take advancement into account only when it occurs in
combination with other factors indicating obstruction of an investigation,
and then he gave examples of those indicators that included several signs of
an obstruction scheme that are unrelated to advancement. 350 Three of the
examples McNulty listed as evidence of impeding an investigation when
discussing the Thompson Memo match examples listed in the McNulty
Memo's "Obstructing the Investigation" provision.351 On the one hand,
those comments preceded the creation of the new policy, and McNulty did
not offer examples of relevant circumstances when discussing the test in the
new policy. 352 On the other hand, in his comments on the McNulty Memo,
he highlighted the similarities between prosecutors' conduct under the old
policy and the new policy.353 Plus, in those later comments he suggested
that the rare cases where prosecutors consider advancement are those in
which organizations "use advancement, and other methods, to stop the flow
of information." 354  Indeed, the press has quoted him as saying that
prosecutors may weigh the decision to pay legal fees if an organization
"engages in a 'pattern of obstruction.' 355
All of these comments suggest that the Justice Department's policy is
susceptible to an interpretation that would allow the government to use
signs of conduct aimed at obstruction generally, even if such conduct did
not involve advancement, to conclude that advancement itself was used
improperly. Thus, for example, if an organization offered advancement to
employees for legitimate corporate purposes, but the organization had made
a frivolous claim of privilege, the government could give it a negative mark
for obstructing the investigation (under section VII.B.4 of the McNulty
348. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
349. The "Obstructing the Investigation" subsection immediately follows (but is separate
from) the subsection on "Shielding Culpable Employees and Agents" that discusses
advancement. McNulty Memo, supra note 111, at VII.B.4, VII.B.3. Each subsection is
listed under the section on "Charging a Corporation: The Value of Cooperation." Id. at VII.
350. See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 120.
352. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text (omitting mention of any
circumstances or specific factors to consider under the new policy's totality of the
circumstances test).
353. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
354. See supra note 297 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
355. See supra note 297.
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Memo), and it could use the improper privilege claim as a factor in the
totality of the circumstances test to argue that the advancement justifies a
second negative mark for shielding culpable employees (under section
VII.B.3 of the McNulty Memo). In short, the policy allows the government
to treat advancement that merely accompanies obstruction of an
investigation the same as advancement that the organization intended to use
to further that obstruction.
Taken together, the new checks on discretion and the remaining
ambiguity in the totality of circumstances test create a policy that limits the
government's discretion to scrutinize advancement to a handful of cases.
However, the policy reserves broad discretion in defining those few cases,
at least for the Deputy Attorney General who approves the requests to
consider advancement, if not for individual prosecutors. Since some large
and important organizations may not have state law or contractual
obligations to advance attorneys' fees, 356 if they engage in any conduct
impeding an investigation then their advancement of fees, innocent or not,
may count against them. Indeed, since KPMG had made frivolous privilege
claims early in the government's investigation, 357 and since the firm may
have had no obligation to advance fees to many of its employees, 358 the
McNulty Memo would allow the Justice Department to count the payments
against the firm. Some critics have continued to express skepticism about
how effectively the new policy will limit government scrutiny of
advancement in important cases,35 9 and the remaining uncertainty about
when and how prosecutors will examine advancement justifies such
concerns.
Additionally, the remaining ambiguity frustrates the goals and benefits of
the guidelines, which also undermines the usefulness of the new policy.
First, the Justice Department intended for its new policy to reinforce the
perception of fairness. 360 By failing to separate conduct indicating
obstruction of the investigation from the use of advancement to shield
culpable employees, however, the policy appears to allow unfair
government targeting of legitimate advancement. Second, the Justice
Department's internal guidelines generally help achieve uniformity in the
application of federal law and prevent mistakes and abuses, 361 as well as
preempt overly restrictive external regulations. 362
Other guidelines achieve those ends by providing concrete details for the
Justice Department to follow in implementing its policy. For example, to
subpoena defense lawyers and members of the media, the United States
Attorneys' Manual requires prosecutors to obtain approval from Main
356. For example, KPMG and Ernst & Young are both Delaware LLPs, see supra note
26, and they are two of the four biggest accounting firms. Reilly, supra note 94.
357. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
358. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 148.
361. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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Justice and lists factors that will be considered in determining if that
approval is warranted. 363 The guidelines on seeking the death penalty also
require approval from Main Justice.364 While the death penalty guidelines
do not list the specific types of factors that can be considered, they do
impose evidentiary standards that limit what qualifies for consideration and
describe the type of analysis Main Justice should conduct in weighing the
factors submitted. 365 On the one hand, the McNulty Memo's advancement
provision resembles those other guidelines because it requires approval
from a senior official who can prevent abuses and mistakes. Furthermore,
the Deputy Attorney General could choose to apply the policy uniformly by
approving requests to count advancement only where advancement itself
was used to obstruct an investigation. To that extent, the McNulty Memo
could accomplish many of the same goals as other internal guidelines. On
the other hand, since the ambiguity in the McNulty Memo would allow the
Deputy Attorney General to grant approval to count advancement merely
because a company engaged in conduct such as making frivolous assertions
of privilege, the new policy does not necessarily increase uniformity in
those cases in which the government takes advancement into account.
Moreover, even if the current Deputy Attorney General decided to grant
approvals only where the advancement itself was improper, the policy
would not prevent his successor from reading the policy differently.
Finally, where the Justice Department imposes self-created guidelines, it
can head off more restrictive, externally imposed regulation. 366
Nonetheless, some continue to doubt that the new policy goes far
enough. 367 The lingering ambiguity in the totality of circumstances test
somewhat weakens the Justice Department's case that it has self-regulated
and, therefore, should not be subjected to outside regulation. For these
reasons, the McNulty Memo' s lack of specificity undermines its usefulness.
D. A Proposal to Clarify the McNulty Memo
Although the McNulty Memo generally is consistent with the
requirements of prosecutorial ethics, the Justice Department could make it
more useful by clearing up the ambiguity in how it will apply the
advancement provision's totality of the circumstances test. The provision
should address whether an organization's purpose and effect in offering
advancement is specifically to obstruct an investigation, not whether other
actions that the organization took are obstructive. Accordingly, the Justice
Department should add language to clarify how it will use the totality of
circumstances test. Specifically, the policy should be amended to state the
following:
363. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
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Where the corporation impedes the investigation by engaging in the
conduct described in VII.B.4 ("Obstructing the Investigation"), such
conduct does not necessarily indicate that the advancement itself
constitutes an improper attempt to shield the corporation and its culpable
employees from government scrutiny. Rather, other facts are required
that show that in the totality of the circumstances the advancement is part
of the obstruction scheme.
That language would guide the use of the totality of the circumstances
test, leaving the government discretion to consider advancement where it is
relevant, while preventing the automatic addition of a negative mark for
innocent advancement merely because other factors such as frivolous
privilege assertions are present. Moreover, the change would underscore
how infrequently the Justice Department should take advancement into
account, providing additional meaning to the Justice Department's bottom-
line standard that it will scrutinize advancement only in "extremely rare
cases.
'368
Already, the new policy's requirements should decrease controversy by
helping to assure uniform application of scrutiny of advancement and to
prevent abuses or other problems. 369 By taking the additional step of
amending the language to clarify the purpose and use of the totality of the
circumstances test, the government would likely improve the consistency of
the policy's application, reinforce the perception of fairness, and head off
more restrictive external regulations, such as the Specter bill.
CONCLUSION
The debate over the government's policy on advancement continues,
with some still calling for additional restrictions beyond what the Justice
Department has developed thus far. Although scrutiny of advancement
raises public policy and ethical concerns, several other concerns mitigate
against banning the practice outright. Thus, prosecutors should retain
discretion to consider advancement in some cases, although they should
exercise that discretion only where it is necessary. While the McNulty
Memo goes a long way toward achieving the proper balance, it could be
adjusted to better accomplish that end. This Note's proposed alteration
would prevent the government from considering advancement in cases
where it merely accompanies other forms of obstruction unrelated to the
shielding of culpable employees.
368. See supra notes 285-87.
369. See supra notes 336-45 and accompanying text.
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